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Repeating a Failed Experiment? 
During the 1990s, the World Bank and several donor partners provided a ― surge‖ in external aid to 
support Pakistan’s social sectors.  By most measures, the program failed.  Despite millions of dollars 
of outside aid to support antipoverty programs, poverty was higher in Pakistan in 2004 than it was a 
decade earlier when the program began.  Nearly a decade after the completion of the World Bank’s 
program,  donors  in  Pakistan—including  the  United  States,  the  World  Bank,  and  the  Asian 
Development  Bank—are  again  poised  to  invest  billions  of  dollars  in  development  assistance  in 
Pakistan.  Will they repeat the same mistakes? 
In 2005, along with  CGD researchers  Milan Vaishnav and Adeel Malik, one of us  prepared an 
analysis of the World Bank’s social-sector lending in Pakistan from 1990 to 2003.  The study reports 
in painstaking detail the problems of the World Bank and other donors in the 1990s working with the 
government on health and education in Pakistan.  The lessons from this massive donor experiment in 
the 1990s are even more relevant today, as the United States and other multilateral partners prepare 
to increase their assistance to Pakistan to historic levels.  Today Pakistan is increasingly viewed by 
U.S. policymakers as one of the most critical—if not the most critical—fronts in the U.S.-led efforts 
to combat extremism. Explaining that the United States cannot secure its interests in Pakistan with 
― bombs  and  bullets  alone,‖  President  Obama  pointed  to  economic  development  as  a  central 
component of the United States’ security strategy in Pakistan, and Congress authorized a tripling of 2 
 
foreign assistance to Pakistan over the next five years to $7.5 billion.  Ambassador Holbrooke has 
called for even more assistance to Pakistan. 
Will tripling (or even quadrupling) U.S. aid money to Pakistan work?  What lessons can the United 
States learn from past donor experiences in Pakistan?  As the Birdsall et al. 2005 analysis illustrates, 
the challenges of effectively spending massive amounts of aid in Pakistan are immense.  Despite huge 
inflows of assistance from donors and multilateral creditors, Pakistan has made little if any progress 
on the fundamentals of social development, state-building, growing the middle class, and reducing 
poverty.  Its democracy is fragile, corruption and patronage are rampant in government, most of its 
children never complete primary school, and its health indicators lag far behind those of Bangladesh 
despite its higher average income. As of 2006, the proportion of people living under the poverty line 
in Pakistan was nearly 23 percent.
1 
As U.S. policymakers plan for spending vast new aid resources in Pakistan, they would be wise to 
consider several important lessons from recent donor experience there.
2   
The World Bank’s $450 Million Experiment 
In the early 1990s, the World Bank launched an ambitious, multiyear initiative in Pakistan called the 
― Social Action Program‖ (SAP).  Between 1992 and 2002, SAP aimed to address Pakistan’s chronic 
underachievement in its social sectors.  The program set out to improve the quality, efficiency and 
coverage of basic services like primary health, education, family planning, and rural water supply 
                                                           
1http://www.worldbank.org.pk/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/PAKISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:2
1845538~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:293052,00.html  
2 This paper re-releases the original analysis of the Social Action Program and delineates the main lessons for  U.S. 
policymakers from the challenges the World Bank faced in its “surge” of aid money to Pakistan in the 1990s. 
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and sanitation.   The World Bank, in collaboration with several other donors,
3 disbursed $450 million 
over ten years.  The idea was to provide sufficiently large support to provoke greater spending by the 
Government of Pakistan and to ensure leverage for key reforms, including reduced patronage and 
corruption.   
The scale of the program was impressive.  It spanned some 27 different sub-programs, four sectors, 
all four provinces, and the tribal belt.  By almost all counts, however, the Social Action Program 
failed.   Despite the enormous investment of donor resources, Pakistan’s human development 
statistics showed little, if any, improvement.  In the decade SAP was implemented, Pakistan’s social 
indicators stagnated, improved only marginally, or—in some cases—even deteriorated.  For instance, 
despite SAP’s investments in the education sector, school-enrollment rates stagnated in the 1990s.  
Alarmingly, enrollment for boys and children in public schools actually declined.  While SAP did 
result in some expansion of physical facilities, the extent to which this construction led to better 
health and educational attainment for Pakistani is unclear.  
More disheartening still, despite the World Bank’s perceived leverage, SAP failed in its express 
mission to increase the Government of Pakistan’s financial investment in the social sector.  When the 
program began, the government of Pakistan’s contribution to SAP was 1.6 percent of GDP; by 2000–
2001, the government’s contribution was 1.4 percent of GDP, compared to a target of 1.9 percent.   
What Went Wrong? 
Compared to more conventional donor projects, SAP’s unique program design of directly financing 
Pakistan’s public-sector spending left the World Bank much more exposed to the risks associated 
                                                           
3 The Asian Development, UK’s DFID, the European Commission, and the Netherlands provided the bulk of the 
financial assistance to SAP.   4 
 
with Pakistan’s broader governance challenges:  elite capture, governance failures, endemic 
corruption, lack of accountability, weak public institutions, and a lack of a timely outcome-
monitoring system. This author’s report brings these problems to light: ― The implementation failures 
were rampant—manifested in no-merit recruitment of staff, absenteeism of teachers and doctors, and 
frequent transfers of staff.”  Critical gaps in leadership and continuity of leadership were also major 
challenges.  For instance, the report cited that over a nine-year period, Balochistan had 13 different 
Secretaries of Education and the Government of Punjab had 14 different Secretaries of Public Health 
Engineering.  The impact of these governance challenges was devastating to SAP’s effectiveness.  
“Injecting vast amounts of money into a dysfunctional system was unlikely to be successful. . . .  
Under circumstances of elite capture and misgovernance, more money may not necessarily buy 
social development. . . . The SAP . . . is an example of how easily social sector interventions can be 
hijacked by governance failures.”   
The World Bank’s internal postcompletion report on the program pointed out several other design 
and implementation flaws.
4  During SAP’s implementation, World Bank staff noted these challenges.  
In numerous staff reports and emails, they highlighted the tension between working with the 
Government of Pakistan to address the chronic, long-term implementation bottlenecks and, on the 
other hand, the need to disburse a large amount of money quickly.  In the case of SAP, the donor bias 
towards disbursing (the next period will be better!) was paramount.  As a result, donor resources 
continued to flow despite disappointing performance.  
                                                           
4 These problems include an overly complex program design, lack of ownership and political commitment at the 
provincial level, insufficient accounting systems, and an overestimation of the (limited) provincial capacity and 
ability to bring about institutional reform in the public institutions.   
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“In the absence of clear rules for whether and how to stop disbursements (and perhaps fearing 
accusations of a lack of consistency across provinces), there was little they (donors) could do beyond 
highlighting and haranguing.”   
Poverty Reduction and Economic Policy 
Moreover, the Bank’s broader objectives of sustainable growth and poverty reduction were hijacked 
by SAP.  In particular, poverty reduction boiled down to spending more on social programs.   There 
was no serious dialogue on more fundamental economy-wide constraints:  including fiscal and debt 
problems, political resistance to the critical imperative of changing the tax regime, and the abuse of 
the financial system.  The SAP also largely ignored power relations in rural areas, where a quasi-
feudal system dominated by a powerful landlord class perpetuates resistance to reform.  Even short 
of encouraging greatly needed land reform, SAP missed opportunities to empower women and the 
poor in access to services, including small loans, agricultural extension, and legal aid for enforcement 
of rights to irrigation water.   
New Lending Approaches 
In the wake of SAP’s failures, the Bank turned to new lending approaches that have achieved greater 
success than SAP program.  In 1999 the World Bank launched the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund 
(PPAF), which enables the World Bank to bypass Pakistan’s problematic public sector altogether.  
The PPAF, now supported by the World Bank and several donor partners, provides more than a 
billion dollars to more than 80,000 community organizations, which in turn have provided nearly 2 6 
 
million microcredit loans and grants to rebuild more than 110,000 houses damaged by the 2005 
earthquake.
5   
“Support for the PPAF is a reasonable strategy for the Bank,” concluded the evaluation, ― one that 
goes around the problems of governance that undermined SAP loans, by channeling these funds 
directly into the hands of local NGOs who can have an impact at the community level.”   
In addition to launching PPAF, the Bank introduced a completely new approach to lending for 
education in Pakistan.  Loans go directly to provincial governments and provide direct support to 
those governments’ budgets tied to comprehensive reforms at the system level.
6  This approach has 
been successful in the province of Punjab.  There the program includes a framework of sector-wide 
educational reforms as well as both supply-side and demand-side interventions aimed at improving 
school enrollment and quality.  The World Bank cited achievements from 2004–2006 of increased 
budget allocations, a 48 percent increase in total primary school enrollment, and a decrease in the 
gender gap in enrollment.
7  In 2009, the World Bank pledged $350 million to support the program for 
an additional three years. 
   




6 The instrument used, the Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC), is thus akin to the well-known Structural 
Adjustment Loans and Credits, but at the sector (education) level.  
7 World Bank “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 234.1 Million to the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan: Punjab Education Sector Project.”  May 4, 2009.  http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/05/19/000333038_20090519014935/Re
ndered/PDF/475910PAD0P102101Official0Use0Only1.pdf  7 
 
Lessons for the U.S. Government 
1.   More aid money does not necessarily buy more (or better) results.  Including the 
Government of Pakistan’s own spending, billions of dollars were channeled through SAP.  More 
aid money did not buy more results.  In a country plagued by widespread corruption and weak 
governance and institutional capacity, how donor money is spent in Pakistan is vitally important.  
The U.S. government would be well served to find ways to spend money in Pakistan well, instead 
of focusing on emphasizing that they are spending more, even if that ultimately means spending 
less.  (See point 3.)     
2.  Leverage is elusive.  The United States should be realistic about the extent of its leverage and 
influence over key economic policy reforms; it has virtually none.  One of the lessons of the 
World Bank’s SAP experience is that ― leverage is elusive, and its limits should be recognized in 
any strategy to encourage progress against poverty.‖ Recognizing that any leverage that exists 
will come from joint constructive pressure on the Government of Pakistan, the U.S. government 
should lean on the main multilateral partners—including the World Bank, IMF, and ADB—to 
push for policy reforms in Pakistan.  
 
3.  The temptation to disburse must be managed.  Another lesson from the World Bank SAP 
experience is the dangerous pitfalls associated with pressures to continue disbursing money, even 
in the face of poor implementation performance.  The United States will likely face similar 
pressures to disburse, given the underlying motivation of the U.S. government to demonstrate 
their renewed ― partnership‖ and friendship with Pakistan and their efforts to overcome the trust 
deficit of the Pakistan public towards the United States.     8 
 
 
4.  Channeling aid resources through the Pakistan public sector is risky and is not in itself an 
effective strategy for improving governance. The Obama administration has made clear its 
intention to channel an increasing share of U.S. assistance through the Pakistan public sector and 
local Pakistani NGOs, and to spend a smaller share of aid on unpopular U.S. contractors.  The 
assistance strategy for Pakistan specifies that this ― direct assistance through Pakistani 
institutions‖ is intended to ― enhance their capacity and to bolster economic and political reform,‖ 
and ― build long-term capacity at the sub-national government level.‖   
The World Bank’s SAP experience highlights the risk associated with this strategy and casts 
doubt on this assertion that funding the Pakistan public sector is in itself an effective capacity-
building exercise.  Pakistan is a daunting environment for administering effective aid through the 
Pakistan public sector.  Even a strategy for improving governance and institutional capacity must 
confront the thorny issues of endemic corruption, local power relations and political economy.  
Simply directing more money to weak and corrupt institutions will not itself transform Pakistan’s 
public sector governance.   
“One can hardly question that Pakistan needs to spend more resources better in its social 
sectors.  But merely raising the expenditure levels is in itself not an assurance that outcomes will 
improve, particularly in a system characterized by endemic corruption.  Indeed, it may be 
counter-productive, since it may entrench rent-seekers and thus complicate future efforts at 
reform.”   9 
 
5.  Expectations should be managed, especially in the short run.  The World Bank’s experience 
in the 1990s reveals a hard fact: it is difficult to spend large volumes of aid money well in 
Pakistan. Expectations for results, particularly in the short run, should be managed appropriately 
in both the United States and in Pakistan.   
 
6.  Sustainable poverty reduction and development requires addressing structural problems 
and political economy issues.  The U.S. government has reiterated its pledge to form a ― long-
term‖ partnership with Pakistan and to contribute ― sustainable‖ development in the country.  The 
SAP illustrated a striking reality in Pakistan that continues to ring true today: successfully and 
sustainably attacking poverty in Pakistan is simply impossible without addressing the structures 
of economic and political power.  ― Incremental programs—greater access to social services and 
greater access to microfinance—can help people, but will not make a sustainable difference.  A 
country strategy to reduce poverty has to include politically sensitive economy-wide economic 
reforms, and focusing on making government, including local government, more accountable to 
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Over the past decade, the World Bank has consistently emphasized the 
importance of reducing poverty and improving the delivery of basic social 
services in Pakistan.  Indeed, its resolve to do just that is evident in dozens of 
official and unofficial studies and assessments, in the Bank’s country assistance 
strategies, and in the content of its loans.   
 
However, a simple fact remains: since the early 1990s, no measurable 
progress has been made in reducing poverty in Pakistan.  In fact, Pakistan 
remains among the worst countries in the world for a child (and particularly a 
g i r l )  t o  b e  b o r n  i n t o .   T h a t  i s  s o  d e s p ite its relatively auspicious geographic 
position, its reasonably good colonial legacy in terms of a professional civil 
service and the existence of core infrastructure, and the world-class 
accomplishments of its educated citizens in politics, the arts, and academia.   
 
Lack of income growth is not the culprit.2  Growth rates were above the 
developing country average for the first three decades of Pakistan’s 
independence. Though economic growth has been lower (at about 4 percent) in 
the 1990s, Pakistan has not suffered the virtually zero and even negative growth 
of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa where there have been greater gains in 
such social indicators as school enrollment and reduction of infant mortality.  
 
  This report focuses on the role of the World Bank in support of poverty 
reduction during the period beginning in 1990 and concluding in 2003.  We 
review and discuss the Bank’s analytic work and its efforts to bring change 
through policy dialogue and lending programs. Appendices on Bank activities in 
support of education, gender, health, poverty reduction, and the multi-year 
Social Action Programs provide detailed summaries of the situation in Pakistan 
in these areas and of Bank inputs in the 1990s and the first few years of this 
decade.   
 
In this summary, we assess the reasons for the overall failure of the Bank 
to make significant, if any, difference (recognizing the limits of such a position 
                                                 
2 Shahid Javed Burki estimates a 12-fold increase in the size of the economy between 1946 and 
2002.  Per capita income gains were much lower because of very high population growth.  
Pakistan’s persistently high rate of population growth is as much, however, a symptom of its 
continuing poverty as a cause.  In particular, it underlines the fundamental constraint to growth 
and social transformation posed by the continuing low status of women, with its effects on 
unusually high fertility.  See Shahid Javed Burki, “Pakistan Country Assistance Evaluation,” 
Draft working paper prepared for the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department,” June 
28, 2002. 
  1given we cannot know the counterfactual) and the choices the Bank now faces if 
it is to be more effective in its support in the future. 
 
Background: Why So Little Progress Against Poverty? 
 
Pakistan’s people have suffered one of development’s most worrying 
cases of growth without development.3  Pakistan made measurable progress on 
very few dimensions of development—economic, political, or social—in the 
1990s.  Even the more recent signs of progress in managing the economy and 
implementing reforms are not institutionalized nor embedded in a resilient and 
transparent system of government accountability or of adequate checks on abuse 
of power.  Thus, they may be vulnerable to the same setbacks that political 
change brought to past periods of apparent progress.   
 
Over the last three to four decades, economic growth has not translated 
either into widespread improvements in economic opportunities and livelihoods 
for the great majority of its people, or into the building of stable and reliable 
political and economic institutions.  Pakistan is ranked 142nd out of 175 countries 
on the UN Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI) – which 
combines measures of life expectancy, school enrollment, literacy and income to 
allow a broader view of a country’s development.4   
 
It lags well behind other countries with similarly low average income 
levels across almost all indicators of social and human development.  Relative to 
countries with comparable levels of income, Pakistan has 20 percent fewer 
children of elementary school age enrolled in primary school and 40 percent 
fewer girls.5  Its infant mortality rate of 84 per thousand is an astonishing 60 
percent above Bangladesh’s rate of 51 per thousand, and more than four times 
greater than Sri Lanka’s rate of 17 per thousand.   Its total fertility rate (more or 
less the average number of children that women have today) of 5.6 compared to 
3.9 in India and 4.4 in Bangladesh) is a worrying symptom of the low status of 
women in Pakistan.  Discrimination against women is most evident in the stark 
fact that girls between ages 1 and 4 had a 66 percent higher mortality rate than 
boys in the 1990s, contributing to Pakistan’s lower than average female 
proportion of its population.6 
                                                 
3 For a more in-depth examination of this phenomenon, see William Easterly, “The Political 
Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan,” Paper for the Analytical 
Narratives of Growth Project, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2001. 
4 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in 
Today’s Diverse World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
5 The World Bank, Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps, and Rural Dynamics 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002). 
6 See Anne Tinker, Improving Women’s Health in Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank, 1998); and Easterly (2001): Table 4. 
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Figure 1: Poverty Trend in Pakistan: 























    
 Source: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Government of Pakistan. 
One-third of 
Pakistan’s population is 
poor, using the World 
Bank’s definition of people 
living on less that $1 a day.7  
Between 1990 and 2001, the 
evidence demonstrates that 
poverty actually rose (see 
Figure 1).8  According to the 
World Bank’s 2002 Poverty 
Assessment, this increase “is 
in sharp contrast to the 
previous decade, when 
poverty [throughout the 
country] is found to have declined sharply.”9   
 
Though the Gini coefficient of income inequality is not high (compared, 
for example, to many countries in Latin America), social indicators exhibit stark 
differences by gender and between rural and urban areas. 10  A stunning 
illustration of the gender gap is that, in terms of literacy, women are further 
behind men than they were 30 years ago.  In developing countries with 
comparable economic growth, that difference declined sharply. 
 
The largest gaps across the board are those between residents of rural and 
urban areas, and these gaps deserve attention since approximately 71 percent of 
Pakistan’s population lives in rural areas.11    Among rural and urban boys and 
girls in the four provinces, rural girls in Sindh have the lowest primary and 
secondary school enrollment rates (about 25 and 12 percent, respectively).   
Nonetheless, urban girls have higher enrollment rates than rural boys everywhere 
                                                 
7 The World Bank, Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps, and Rural Dynamics 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002): i. 
8 Figure 1 is reprinted from the World Bank’s 2004 Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) 
documentation. 
9 The World Bank, Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps, and Rural Dynamics 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002): 20. 
10 A recent National Human Development Report published by UNDP documented marked and 
persistent differences in the Human Development Index (HDI) across provinces as well.  See 
Akmal Hussain, Pakistan National Human Development Report 2003 (UNDP: Islamabad, 2003). 
11 The World Bank, Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps, and Rural Dynamics 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002): iii. 
  3except the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), suggesting that the constraints 
to increasing school achievement of rural girls are not just cultural. 12 
 
The large gaps by gender and urban vs. rural areas are probably best 
captured in the difference in education between the richest 20 percent of 
households and the poorest 40 percent, considering that education is a good 
measure of permanent income.  Filmer (2001), using household data, finds a 
difference between the median education level of those two income groups of 9 
years, one of the highest in the world.  This summary “gap” may best summarize 
the differences in power and access that are not captured in the traditional 
measure of income inequality, but do seem to affect the most straightforward 
measures of human well-being.13    
 
Why so little progress? 
 
What is behind Pakistan’s lack of progress and resulting backwardness 
compared to its poor South Asian neighbors?  We emphasize four deeply 
embedded political and social problems, the combination of which makes 
development a daunting challenge in Pakistan.14 In discussing the Bank’s 
programs below, we conclude that the failure to take these problems more 
explicitly and systematically into account in the its country strategy and lending 
was at the heart of what became the Bank’s overly narrow approach to poverty 
reduction, including a near-exclusive emphasis on the social sectors. 
 
The first is a continuation in the 1990s of the post-independence history of 
extreme political volatility.  From 1990 to 2000, Pakistan experienced ten changes 
in regime (in one instance, the “caretaker government” of Balakh Sher Mazari 
stayed in office for a mere 39 days).  Constant internecine battles between 
Pakistan’s political parties, religious clerics, and powerful military leaders 
severely hampered the ability of any one government to rule effectively.15  
Compounded by heightened tensions with neighboring India over the disputed 
region of Kashmir, the decision to test a nuclear weapon in 1998, and subsequent 
                                                 
12 The World Bank, Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps, and Rural Dynamics 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002): Table A-3.1. 
13 Filmer (2001) 
14 It is striking that the Bank’s extensive economic and sectoral studies do not include much, if 
any, comparative analyses across countries in South Asia.  Such analyses could provide greater 
insight into the political and historical roots of Pakistan’s growth without development. 
15 The ability and willingness of a powerful military to intervene when civilian leadership 
appears inadequate has probably institutionalized the risk of political volatility.  Since General 
Ayub Khan first assumed power in 1958, the military has intervened in political life on three 
significant occasions: the military’s dismissal of the democratically elected government in 1969; 
General Zia ul-Haq’s coup of 1977; and General Pervez Musharraf’s military intervention in 
October 1999, which displaced the then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.   
  4international sanctions, Pakistan’s political instability reached new heights 
during the turbulent 1990s. 
 
Political volatility has permitted and probably intensified the 
development of a political culture of spoils, in which both politicians and 
bureaucrats, anticipating a loss of position and power at a moment’s notice, 
concentrate on extracting what rents they can from the system rather than 
investing in it.  This creates a vicious cycle in which the resulting deterioration of 
rules and respect gradually undermines existing institutions (such as the initially 
effective and professional civil service).  
 
Second is the economic costs over decades of conflict with India, not only 
in terms of military spending but lost opportunities for trade since “the heavy 
burden of defense on national budgets diverted resources away from a number 
of important sectors that needed public sector attention” and prospects for 
foreign direct investment declined dramatically.  Burki (2002) estimates that the 
cumulative impact of 2001’s near-war with India “may be of the order of 15 
percent of Pakistan’s GDP.”16   
 
The third is the power of the landlord class in the quasi-feudal settings of 
rural Pakistan, emphasized by Hussain (2003) and Easterly (2001).17 Hussain 
focuses on the mechanisms by which landed elites wield control of the market, 
literally robbing the poor through monopoly-like pricing of input prices and 
monopsony control of output prices.  Easterly emphasizes the landed elites’ 
resistance to the education of the poor and to other investments which would 
empower the poor, particularly women.18   Ali (2004) argues that the political 
resilience of the semi-feudal agrarian hierarchy helps explain longstanding 
resistance in Pakistan to consistent pro-business and pro-market reforms.19  
 
                                                 
16 See Shahid Javed Burki, “Pakistan Country Assistance Evaluation,” Draft working paper 
prepared for the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department,” June 28, 2002. 
17 See Akmal Hussain, Pakistan National Human Development Report 2003 (UNDP: Islamabad, 
2003); and William Easterly, “The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case 
Study of Pakistan,” Paper for the Analytical Narratives of Growth Project, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, June 2001. 
18 Of course the landlord class is not the only powerful group with vested interests.  In addition 
to the military and political and bureaucratic interests, a large and powerful urban industrial and 
financial class exists, and as elsewhere, resisted trade and financial reforms in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  Most recently, export success in some sectors and more open capital markets have 
reinforced trade and financial reforms.   Change appears to be coming much more slowly in rural 
areas, where more of Pakistan’s poor reside.  This is the case even though many of the same 
people are probably both members of both the landed and industrial elites. 
19 Imran Ali, “Historical Impacts on Political Economy in Pakistan”, Asisan Journal of Management Cases, 
2004. 
  5The fourth is the problem of ethnic, religious and other divisions that 
plague Pakistan.20  Urdu is the native tongue of only 8 percent of the population; 
at least 20 other languages are spoken in Pakistan.  There are fierce and 
continuing tensions between natives of Pakistan at independence and the 
Muslim immigrants in Karachi (Muhajirs); between Shia and Sunnis; between 
Islamists and secularists; and Punjabis and natives of Sindh.21 Since the move 
toward increased “Islamization” under Zia-ul-Haq, other divisions have been 
exploited in politics and by outside Islamic fundamentalist groups. The very 
definition of Islamic has become contentious and exclusive.   
 
There are other ways to explain Pakistan’s poor record in reducing 
poverty and improving social indicators.  Each has its own logic, though we 
believe they are symptoms of the above underlying forces rather than causes in 
themselves. 
 
Low spending on direct and indirect measures is an obvious one.  In 2003-
4, the Government of Pakistan aimed to spend a paltry 0.5 percent and 1.8 
percent of GDP on health and education, respectively.22 Development 
expenditures fell in the 1990s, from 6.4 percent of GDP in 1991 to 3 percent in 
1999.23 W h y  i s  s p e n d i n g  s o  l o w ?   E a s t e r l y ’s statistical analysis suggests that 
Pakistan spends 3.3 percentage points of GDP more on defense than other 
countries of its income level, an amount roughly equal to Pakistan’s under-
spending (in a statistical sense) compared to other countries, given its income, on 
health and education.24  “Inflexible” defense spending, rising debt servicing and 
stagnation in government revenues have contributed to the shrinking of fiscal 
space.  Other explanations for low social spending include: the lack of political 
will, the low level of effective demand for spending, particularly among the rural 
poor who have virtually no political power, and the highly centralized nature of 
social programs at the provincial level, which undermines any political incentive 
to respond to local demands.   
 
Regarding low spending on social programs, for the bureaucratic and 
technocratic elite at the federal and other levels, there is an important additional 
complication, prevalent in all countries but almost surely (based on anecdotal 
                                                 
20 Easterly (2002); Hussain (1999) 
21 “With an insecure elite preferring cultural and religious atavism to social and institutional change, major 
gender, caste and ethnic contradictions remain unresolved.”  (Ali, 2004, p. 144). 
22 International Monetary Fund, 2003, Pakistan: Sixth and Seventh Reviews Under the Three-Year 
Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Staff Report, Washington, D.C. 
23 World Bank, Pakistan – Public Expenditure Review, 2003.  Development expenditures as used 
here refers to new investment. 
24 William Easterly, “The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study of 
Pakistan,” Paper for the Analytical Narratives of Growth Project, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, June 2001. 
  6evidence) worse in Pakistan.  Spending on social services is heavily concentrated 
in spending on salaries of providers.  The relatively low non-salary expenditures 
on health and education in the 1990s were additionally squeezed by the slow 
down in development spending.25 Along with spending on local infrastructure 
that would meet the immediate needs of the poor, such spending is highly 
vulnerable to patronage and corruption.  As desirable as it might seem to 
increase spending in these areas, even reformers who might otherwise champion 
increases are unlikely to do so.  
 
As we emphasize below, other symptoms of the political economy 
constraints to reducing poverty (and achieving sustainable growth) manifest 
themselves in the political impossibility of taxing agricultural land; the abuse of 
the irrigation system by those with privileged access or power and the related 
continuing deterioration of the natural resource base on which the poor depend 
for their livelihoods; the continuing difficulty of creating an open and 
competitive financial and banking system (though in this area there appears to 
have been more progress recently) which might make credit available to the poor 
and working classes; the periodic overspending of limited public resources on 
white elephants such as the motorway between Lahore and Islamabad, with high 
opportunity costs for investments in rural roads and community infrastructure; 
and so on.26   
 
In the 1990s, longstanding problems were exacerbated by another round 
of political volatility, with the advent and decline of four civilian administrations 
headed alternately by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from 1988-1999; by low 
growth and the burden of high debt ( p u b l i c  d e b t  a s  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  G D P  
approached the 100 percent mark in the year 2000, much of it inherited from the 
1980s and 1990s); and by the resulting intensification of longstanding fiscal 
pressures.  These had the effect of reducing spending on poverty reduction 
programs and social services below what they might have been, while providing 
an immediate explanation for the government’s failure to reach spending targets.  
Ironically that created increased pressure on the World Bank to sustain its own 
commitments in the social sectors – despite failed commitments on the part of the 




                                                 
25 The World Bank, Pakistan Public Expenditure Management: Strategic Issues and Reform Agenda, 
Volume 1, Report No. 25665-PK, January 28, 2004: 10-11. 
26 The Work Bank cited the Lahore-Islamabad Motorway as “the most egregious example” of a 
large-scale “low priority” public investment undertaken by the government.  See The World 
Bank, Pakistan Public Expenditure Management: Strategic Issues and Reform Agenda, Volume 1, 
Report No. 25665-PK, January 28, 2004: 38. 
  7The World Bank’s Programs: A Flawed Strategy for Attacking Poverty 
 
  In the 1980s, World Bank lending in Pakistan for poverty and social 
programs was relatively small – amounting to an accumulated $415 million out 
of $5.5 billion (or around 8 percent of all lending).  Of this sum, nearly 95 percent 
was allocated for education.  By the early 1990s, however, following the 
emphasis in the 1980s on support for macroeconomic and structural reform, and 
in response to the backlash that emphasis had generated in the broader 
development community, the Bank resolved to substantially increase its support 
for programs that would bring direct benefits to the world’s poor.  In Pakistan, 
that resolve was reflected in an increase in the proportion of total lending 
directed to the social sectors, from 8 percent in the 1980s to approximately 27.5 
percent in the 1990s, and to the decision to finance a large and ambitious 
program across all social sectors and in all parts of the country, called the Social 
Action Program (SAP). 
 
  The Bank’s first Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of the review period 
was issued in 1992.27  The 1992 CAS sets out four priorities for the Bank’s 
program in Pakistan; the fourth of these calls for “accelerating growth efforts to 
tackle poverty…through preparation and implementation of a Social Action 
Program, including policies and programs which improve the coverage and 
quality of basic social services and infrastructure.”28   
 
  In order to achieve “the twin goals of poverty reduction and sustained 
growth”, the Bank—in its 1994 Country Assistance Strategy – reiterated renewed 
commitment to the social sectors as one of its four priority areas.29  The Bank 
strategy emphasized improving the quality and coverage of basic social services, 
the overall efficiency of the health and education sectors, and improving and 
expanding local community participation. The CAS once again cited the 
centrality of Bank support for the Social Action Program, a Government initiative 
that had been proposed by the new Sharif government.  (At the time, Bank staff 
were cautiously optimistic: “The SAP offers no instant solutions, but will help 
improve social indicators over time, assuming it continues to receive the funding, 
implementation, and political support needed.”30) 
 
                                                 
27 The 1992 CAS was not issued as a stand-alone document; rather, it was submitted to the Board 
as an attachment to the Fordwah Eastern Sadiqia (South) loan on June 11, 1992.    
28 World Bank, Fordwah Eastern Sadiqia (South) Irrigation and Drainage Project, Report No. P-5749-
PAK, June 11, 1992. 
29 World Bank, Pakistan Country Assistance Strategy, 1994.  The other priority areas were 
infrastructure, agricultural productivity and management of natural resources, and structural 
adjustment. 
30 Ibid, p. 5  
  8  Throughout the remainder of the 1990s, the Social Action Program became 
the country’s and the Bank’s primary policy vehicle for expanding the coverage, 
quality, and effectiveness of basic social services including primary education, 
primary health, family planning, and rural water supply and sanitation.  A 
multi-year, multi-disciplinary strategy to reverse Pakistan’s poor performance in 
the social sectors, SAP was a central feature of the Bank’s Country Assistance 
Strategies throughout the decade.  Additional social projects financed by the 
Bank were implemented under the loose “framework” of the SAP (though it is 
unclear what this relationship meant in practice). 
 
  Put another way, the SAP also became the Bank’s central vehicle more 
generally for poverty reduction and broad-based growth.  Through the SAP, the 
Bank’s strategy, in terms of its policy dialogue and lending, was reduced for all 
practical purposes to an almost singular concentration on social service delivery.  
The SAP, in turn, was—at least in its early years—heavily focused on the goal of 
increasing public spending on social services (this was the initial reasonable goal 
of the reformers in government who created the program; if they had stayed in 
office longer, perhaps they would have made the adjustments that time and 
experience called for).   
 
The advent of the military government of General Pervez Musharraf in 
1999 marked a “second phase” of Bank operations in Pakistan.  When the 
Musharraf government assumed power, it placed a relatively high premium on 
liberalization, fiscal reform, a return to privatization and regulatory reform, and 
devolution of fiscal and administrative responsibilities to the district level (and 
below).  This new phase coincided with the winding down of the SAP, the Bank’s 
shift to new modalities of lending directly to the provinces (this is discussed in 
greater detail in a later section), and amplified rhetoric about “pro-poor” growth, 
“empowerment,” and reducing “vulnerability.”  Yet with a few exceptions, the 
Bank’s essential poverty reduction strategy remained the same: encouraging 
increased government spending on social services such as health, education, and 
family planning.  Although with experience and information accruing over the 
review period, issues of management, implementation, “governance” 
(patronage, staff turnover, corruption) became increasingly visible, they have 
continued to be discussed and addressed primarily in the context of encouraging 
increases in spending (with increasing emphasis on “effectiveness” of programs, 
at least on paper) on social services.  
 
Three sins of omission 
 
  The Bank’s poverty strategy thus abstracted from certain realities, all of 
which affect the livelihoods of the poor, and the vulnerability of their livelihoods 
to factors beyond their control: 
  9 
•  Economy-wide constraints to reducing poverty were not frontally 
addressed as critical constraints to attacking poverty (though they were on 
the IMF and World Bank’s macro-reform agendas, consistently emerging 
in the form of oft-repeated conditionalities). These constraints included 
not only the obvious fiscal and debt problems that restricted expenditures 
on rural roads, drainage, power, and maintenance of deteriorating 
irrigation systems, but the political resistance to changing the tax regime 
(which is critical for creating incentives for the sale of highly concentrated 
land) and the abuse of the financial system. 
 
•  Power relations in rural areas were largely ignored for much of the review 
period, especially in terms of lending.  Even without land reform (though 
this is fundamental and was also repeatedly discussed in the context of 
adjustment loans), some progress might have been made with greater 
initial attention to community development and community-based 
infrastructure, access to small loans, agricultural extension, and legal aid 
programs for enforcement of rights to irrigation water on behalf of the 
poor.  The opportunity cost of the inability of women to exploit 
opportunities to improve their own productivity in rural areas, in part 
because of their disempowerment, was not raised.31  Equally ignored were 
power relations in urban areas; it seems likely that bureaucratic politics, 
regulatory burdens and tax harassment affect the ability of the poor to 
start and manage small businesses in Pakistan’s cities, and that the 
increasing presence of small arms and of criminality and ethnic violence 
disproportionately hurt the poor. 
 
•  The effects on the poor of the deteriorating natural resource base, 
particularly the irrigation system, were not analytically linked to the 
persistence of poverty and the failure of the rate of poverty to fall in the 
1990s. Evidence that landlords are increasing the proportion of irrigation 
charges that sharecroppers must pay is an alarming sign of the increasing 
cost of running the system as well as of the latter’s lack of market power. 
 
                                                 
31 Country assistance strategy documents of 1995, 2002, and 2003 all discuss what came to be 
called (in 2002) “pro-gender equity” policies.  However, the strategy is essentially to “highlight 
expanded access to quality education and health services for women and children.” (2003).  
Although there is reference to other possible “gender-specific” programs such as rural 
employment, it is not clear whether and how the Bank pursued these in the country dialogue 
throughout the 1990s.  The October 2003 appraisal of the Second Pakistan Poverty Alleviation 
Fund (PPAF) project does refer to women’s “lack of control over financial/productive assets” as a 
finding of the 2002 Poverty Assessment.  This is one of the first clear statements we could find.  
See also Appendix on Gender.   
  10Many of the above issues that should surely be central to the Bank’s 
overall strategy in Pakistan are referred to in the CASs and discussed in 
economic and sector work, but almost always in general terms, and typically 
then followed by a concrete allusion to social services (See Table 1). 
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Table 1: Boiling down poverty reduction to social service delivery 
 
 
…World Bank’s assistance strategy focuses on two closely linked development goals: 
poverty reduction and reducing constraints to sustained growth.  To address the poverty 
reduction objective, the Bank’s approach highlights improving inadequate basic social 
services and so improving weak social indicators… 
 
-- Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report (July 11, 1994) 
 
The Bank Group will assist the Government’s poverty reduction efforts by supporting the 
SAP and complimentary projects in education, health, and population… 
 
The SAP represents the Government’s best effort yet to address a root cause of poverty in 
Pakistan by improving systematically access and quality of basic social services… 
 
-- Country Assistance Strategy (November 22, 1995) 
 
Helping Pakistan to reduce poverty through investing in people, raising productivity, and 
promoting economic growth remains the core of the Bank’s country assistance strategy… 
 
…poverty reduction remains constrained by Pakistan’s long neglect of basic social 
services… 
-- Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report (March 20, 1997) 
 
Because a strong foundation of literate, numerate, and healthy people is essential for 
growth and poverty reduction, the Bank’s strategy is to help Pakistan expand access to and 
improve the quality of its social services.  
 
-- Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report (December 28, 1998) 
 
As evidenced by the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy documents, the 
Bank’s basic mantra throughout the 1990s was that efforts to reduce poverty 
were seriously constrained by the Government of Pakistan’s historical neglect of 
basic social services.  That this is true is obvious.  That it does not go to the heart 
of the challenge is a fundamental analytic omission.   
 
In contrast is the 2003 Pakistan National Human Development Report, 
prepared by an independent Pakistani consultant, which includes the following 
language: “[T]he poor face markets, state institutions and local structures of 
power that discriminate against [them]. . .[They are] “locked in a nexus of power 
that systematically perpetuates poverty…unable to access public entitlements 
like political processes, or goods and services.”32   
 
                                                 
32 We were told that the author of the 2003 Pakistan Human Development report had offered to 
work on the Bank’s poverty assessment, without a fee, but had his offer turned down.  
  12The Bank’s strategy in support of women has the same characteristic.  On 
the one hand, during the review period, the Bank was in no way hesitant in 
promoting policies and programs to improve women’s status and opportunities.  
Analysis of the problem and statements about its centrality are evident in Bank 
documents, including numerous CASs and in the project appraisal and 
supervision reports of the Social Action Program, as well as in the Bank’s 
support for reproductive health and family planning, both directly and in the 
context of broader health sector loans.33  In education loans in the latter part of 
the review period, there is considerable emphasis on subsidies and other 
approaches (more female teachers, more attention to safety, security, and 
convenience – latrines for girls) to increase the incentive of families and of 
schools to enroll girls in school.  Given the dismal state of health and education 
indicators for girls, such a focus on social services was appropriate.  On the other 
hand, there was strikingly little emphasis, in strategic work or in lending, on 
creating income-generating activities for women or finding ways to increase their 
political and social empowerment.34  The only (and partial) exception is the 
targeting of micro-credit to women in the poverty alleviation programs 
supported by loans approved in 1999 and 2003. 35  
 
Knowing but not saying . . . 
 
This is not to say that Bank management and staff were ignorant of these 
issues of power and political economy, only to suggest that the failure to come to 
grips with them in any official statements inhibited a broader and healthier 
dialogue, and narrowed the lending program to the familiar, conventional 
“social” programs.  In fact, by the end of the 1990s and in the last few years, there 
was better articulation in Bank documents of some fundamental problems 
plaguing Pakistan’s poor, especially in the agriculture sector.  Annex 1 offers an 
accounting of World Bank most relevant analytic and advisory (AAA) work in 
the social sectors from 1990-2003. 
 
The Bank’s 2002 poverty assessment, issued at the tail end of the period 
under review, provides an excellent discussion of rural landlessness, and brings 
out the growing evidence of a negative effect of land inequality on agricultural 
productivity.  It is also the case that by the late 1990s and in the first few years of 
this decade, there has been more attention paid to participatory development in 
the CASs, and the lending program has included support for the PPAF (Pakistan 
Poverty Alleviation Fund) under which grants are made available to NGOs to 
                                                 
33 For details, see Appendix C. 
34 For instance, there is not yet an analysis of the implications of devolution for women, given the 
political quota system. 
35 Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) Project I and II, are discussed in greater detail in 
Appendix D. 
  13provide direct programs and services to the poor (a second, much larger loan in 
support of the PPAF was approved in late 2003).36 And starting in 1996, the Bank 
began financing small community infrastructure programs (for which the 
Government has recently suggested dropping World Bank support), which rely 
on motivating and empowering local citizens.37 
  
Overall, however, the picture is one of reluctance in AAA work to grapple 
directly with the political economy problems so fundamental to Pakistan’s 
historic and ongoing failure to make significant progress in reducing poverty; 
and a resulting inability on the part of the Bank to support reformers in Pakistan, 
if and when opportunities might have arisen, to go beyond the social services in 
dialogue and lending.  It may be that, in this respect, the Pakistan AAA work 
and lending program does not differ much from that in other countries.  The 
Bank is not known for its political economy analysis; and lending in support of 
the agriculture sector and rural development, for one example, was low in all 
regions in the 1990s.  Nevertheless, the fact is that the reduction of a “poverty 
strategy” to a near-exclusive focus (in policy dialogue and in lending) on the 
social sectors appears to have been all too easy and convenient, as it justified a 
relatively large lending program in sectors where the Bank was accustomed to 
make loans.  
 
Even the move toward more direct support with the two PPAF loans in 
the last few years is consistent with the discovery of a relatively easy vehicle for 
lending—and there is some controversy over whether the PPAF is reaching 
community groups as grants are often channeled through large NGOs (such as 
the national and provincial rural support programs) that are themselves seen as 
part of the power structure in some quarters.  As we discuss below, the near-
willful abstraction from political economy and so-called governance problems as 
they affected poverty reduction also adversely affected the design and 
implementation of Bank loans in the period under review.  
 
The World Bank’s Programs: Lending 
 
Comparing the Bank’s role in Pakistan prior to the 1990s and after, Burki 
(2002) suggests that in the earlier period the Bank’s lending priorities more or 
less matched the priorities of the various Government administrations, but that 
starting in the early 1990s, “the Bank groups began to aggressively pursue a 
                                                 
36 For more discussion of the Bank’s AAA work on poverty, and its lending for poverty 
alleviation, see Appendix D. 
37 Despite reports of the Government of Pakistan’s lack of enthusiasm concerning slow-
disbursing, community based projects (vice quick-disbursing adjustment loans), in May 2004 the 
Bank approved a $37.1 million loan in support of a second phase of the NWFP Community 
Infrastructure Project (CIP).   
  14development agenda that did not win easy ownership amongst Pakistani 
policymakers.”38 
 
A major difference was the Bank’s emphasis on social programs to 
address Pakistan’s low social indicators. (This disjuncture is perhaps best 
represented by Burki; his comparison is reprinted in Annex 2).  The principal 
victims were the Social Action Programs supported by the Bank, along with 
other donors, throughout the 1990s.  In retrospect, it is clear that the two pillars 
of the broader Bank strategy in the early 1990s—ownership by governments of 
Bank-supported reform programs, and a focus on reducing poverty—could not 
be easily reconciled in Pakistan, at least not in the short run with the blunt 
instrument of “social” lending.  
 
We divide this discussion of lending into two periods: the first period, 
which consists of the two loans in support of the Social Action Program, along 
with an accompanying set of smaller and more conventional projects supporting 
health, education or family planning programs at the provincial and federal 
levels; and a second period, roughly coinciding with the advent of the Musharraf 
government.   
 
In broad terms, the first period was marked by a single-minded effort to 
disburse funds for social sector programs, with at most marginal adjustments of 
tactics in the face of fundamental problems of a centralized system plagued by 
corruption and lack of accountability, and with little political ownership at the 
provincial level.  In the second period, the strategy remained similar—to increase 
spending on social programs, though with more emphasis on effectiveness and 
results via the use of “program” lending which is in principle tied to 
demonstrated performance.  
                                                 
38 Shahid Javed Burki, “Pakistan Country Assistance Evaluation,” Draft working paper prepared 
for the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department,” June 28, 2002: 13. 
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Table 2: Social sector projects, 1990—2003 (including Provincial SACs) 
 
 
Phase One (1990-1998) 
 
 
Phase Two (1999-2004) 
 
1990 – Sindh Primary Education 
Development 
1991 – Family Health 
1993 – Family Health II 
1992 – Middle Schooling 
1993 – Balochistan Primary Education 
1994 – Social Action Program 
1995 – NWFP Primary Education 
Project 
1995 – Population Welfare Program 
1996 – Northern Health 
1998 – Northern Education 
1998 – Social Action Program II 
 
 
1999 – Poverty Alleviation Fund 
2002 – Sindh Structural Adjustment   
Credit 
2002 – NWFP Structural Adjustment 
Credit 
2003 – Poverty Alleviation Fund II 
2003 – National Education Assessment 
System 
2003 – Partnership for Polio 
Eradication 
2003 – HIV/AIDS Prevention Project 
2004 – Punjab Education Reform 
Adjustment Credit 




Phase I: The 1990s and the SAPs – Feeding the beast 
 
The Nawaz Sharif government that took office in 1990, with the leadership 
of a small but sophisticated and committed group of technocrats, created (and 
initially “owned”) the Social Action Program.  The Government, its leadership, 
and an increasing number of ordinary Pakistanis recognized that Pakistan 
suffered from a massive social deficit.39  From the reformers’ point of view, a 
critical first step was to lock in a healthy increase in public spending on social 
programs.  The Sharif government was also opening the economy and initiating 
a program of privatization, and making efforts to reduce the budget deficit and 
halt what had been a rapid build-up of public debt in the 1980s.  In this resource-
constrained environment, there was, as it turns out, a need simply to protect 
existing social expenditures from further cuts.   
 
Against this background, the World Bank and other donors collaborated 
with the Government in what was meant to be a massive new initiative for 
                                                 
39 At that time, in fact, seminal work was being done by Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq at 
UNDP where he created and led the work on the Human Development Report, based on the idea 
that “human development” is the real objective of growth.   
  16improving social service delivery.  The Social Action Program was launched in 
1992-93 and implemented in two phases.  Support for the SAP (in the form of 
Social Action Program Projects I and II) was a controversial innovation for the 
Bank, and was recognized as such at the time.40  The premise of the Social Action 
Program Projects was to finance a portion of the country’s social sector budget 
(on a reimbursable basis) sufficient to allow the Bank to leverage its influence 
and to ensure that the donors were in a position to strengthen the hand of those 
reformers in Pakistan who wanted to address the country’s social deficit.41   
 
Table 3: World Bank Social Action Program Loans 
 
  
ICR Rating for 
 
OED Rating for 
 





















1993/4  SAP-I  200  200 Closed  S  M  U  UN  UN N  UN UN  N 
1997/8  SAP-II  250 250  Closed  U M  U  UN UN  M  UN  UN N 
 
The original intention of the donors was to finance as much as 10 percent 
of all social spending by the federal and provincial governments excluding the 
recurrent spending on salaries and other operating costs which most donors are 
traditionally reluctant to finance.  In the end the donors as a group, and 
principally the Bank, financed about 6 percent of all spending. (Several former 
government officials complained that the original plan had been for donors to 
finance much more than 10 percent, and that 6 percent was too small.  In fact, 
with the possible exception of some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, external 
financing of 6 percent of all social spending in a given recipient country is 
exceptional.  It is not at all clear that a higher proportion would have made a 
difference in terms of “leverage”). 42   
 
The SAP was, for all practical purposes, meant to mirror adjustment loans 
in policy intent, though disbursements were still linked to the government’s 
                                                 
40 For a detailed discussion of the SAP objectives, see Appendix E. 
41 In addition to the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DFID), the European Commission, and the 
Government of Netherlands provided the bulk of donor support for the Social Action Program 
(SAP).  In the end, DFID did not disburse funds for SAP II and ended up withdrawing its 
technical assistance following Pakistan’s nuclear testing and the arrival of a military government 
led by Pervez Musharraf.   
42 The initial plans drawn up by the Government of Pakistan in the early 1990s envisioned a 5-50 
burden-sharing agreement under which the Government would contribute 50 percent of SAP 
project costs while donors (led by the World Bank) would come up with the remaining 50 
percent.   
  17submitting evidence of sector-specific expenditures.  It was from the beginning 
an ambitious and massive effort, supporting 27 different sub-programs in four 
sectors (basic education, primary health, population welfare, and rural water 
supply and sanitation) in all four provinces and in the federally administered 
territories, and including direct support to certain federal programs.   
 
The SAP proved to be a major disappointment. The gains, if any, were 
marginal.  If there was any success, it was defined mainly in terms of 
quantitative expansion of physical facilities, but whether these led to better 
outcomes for impoverished Pakistanis is not clear.  To be fair, the SAP did bring 
much-needed attention, both on the part of elites and the populace, to Pakistan’s 
abhorrent social gap.43  It provided a vehicle for increasing awareness, changing 
attitudes, and raising understanding of Pakistan’s pressing social needs.  But 
while not insignificant, this outcome does not adequately justify what was a 
decade-long, multi-billion dollar “experiment.”  
 
  While the gains were marginal, the failures were visible.  The period during 
which the SAP was implemented witnessed stagnation, marginal improvement, 
or – in some cases – even a decline in social indicators.  For example, aggregate 
education enrollment rates stagnated during the 1990s, with enrollments for boys 
and children from public schools registering a modest decline.  The SAP was also 
unsuccessful in meeting a primary objective of raising the Government's 
financial contribution towards the social sector: for example, in 2000-01 the 
Government’s contribution to SAP expenditures reached a low of 1.4% of GDP 
against the targeted 1.9%.  In a 2002 report, Bank staff wrote: “A disquieting 
feature [of the 1990s] has been that the gap between the Government’s targeted 
and actual expenditure on the SAP as a percentage of GDP has been increasing 
since its inception and has increased rather sharply [between 1999-2002].”44  (See 
Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Government Allocations and Expenditures on SAP (Percent of GDP)45 
 
  SAP Allocations and Expenditures (as % of GDP) 
  1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 
Allocations  1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 
                                                 
43 One prominent social phenomenon that received a great deal of attention was “ghost schools.”  
Ghost schools are schools that exist only on paper—often created by corrupt individuals seeking 
to bilk the government out of money by pledging to establish schools, but pocketing the money 
instead.  In 1998, the military dispatched 1,400 army teams charged with verifying the existence 
of over 50,000 schools in Punjab alone.  See BBC News, “Pakistan army seeks out phantom 
schools,” March 23, 1998, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/despatches/68762.stm.  
44 The World Bank, Pakistan Development Policy Review: A New Dawn?, April 3, 2002: 27. 
45 See The World Bank, Social Action Program Implementation Completion Reports (various 
years). 
  18Expenditure  1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.5 
 
What went wrong with the SAP? Why did a sound idea turn into a 
practical disaster? Clearly, a coordinated donor attempt towards improving 
social service delivery was a good idea in principle. At the very least, this was 
supposed to have granted greater leverage to the donors.  Failure can be 
explained in terms of two shortcomings: the initial design abstracted from the 
fundamental problems; and during implementation, the necessary major 
adjustments were never taken.    
 
•  Design shortcomings 
 
Regarding design, the lending instrument was too blunt, and an extremely 
complicated design made it too easy to focus on getting plans and reports and 
reimbursement arrangements organized – independent of whether resources 
were being spent effectively. We emphasized above that the Bank’s appropriate 
concern to support poverty reduction boiled down in practical terms, in the 
lending program, to an increase in the proportion of its total lending going to 
social programs. The design of the SAP “assumed a direct causal link between 
poor social sector outcomes and a low level of public funding,” yet from the 
beginning, “there was…no demonstrated linkage between the proposed 
incremental funding (input), the additional service coverage and quality 
improvements targeted (outputs), and the improved level of social indicators 
(outcomes).”46 
 
The SAP program, in contrast to earlier more conventional projects 
supported by the Bank, exposed the resources of the Bank and the other donors 
in a larger and visible way to the risks faced by the government’s own spending 
in these sectors: political patronage and corruption that were deeply rooted and 
widespread.  The donors were not unaware of the risks of political volatility, elite 
domination, and ethnic factionalism set out above, in terms of social 
expenditures.  Early on in the 1990s, Bank staff were fully aware of the risks 
present in Pakistan: “Political difficulties and governance concerns will continue 
to slow implementation and impact negatively on the efficiency and effectiveness 
of Pakistani development efforts,” stated the Bank’s 1994 CAS.  “Potential 
difficulties include political interference which could weaken the impact of 
policy and other reform.” 47   
 
Internal World Bank emails, memos, and meeting minutes that were 
circulated during the SAP-I project preparation phase demonstrate how well 
                                                 
46 Asian Development Bank, Project Performance Audit Report on the Social Action Program (Sector) 
Project in Pakistan, PPA: PAK 26017, November 2001: 16.  
47 World Bank, 1994, “Pakistan—Country Strategy Paper”: 3.   
  19known the risks of the SAP were at the time.  Several Bank officials expressed 
concern at the complexity, timetable, and strategic underpinnings of the SAP as 
well as the historical dearth of demonstrated Government commitment to the 
social sectors.  In retrospect, these Bank officials appear quite prescient about the 
pitfalls of the SAP.  While their objections were duly noted and raised in 
meetings over a period of two years, in the end their warnings were not heeded 
(See Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Bank Officials Foresaw SAP-I Problems 
 
 
“[T]here is a tension between disbursing a large amount of money quickly (i.e. in two years) and 
working with Government to resolve a number of chronic, long-term implementation 
bottlenecks.  The IEPS [Initial Executive Project Summary of SAP-I] states that there are problems 
at all levels which constrain implementation capacity.  In such case, and given the large sums 
already in the pipeline, it is not clear how additional resources would be spent.48 
 
 
“[W]ith some 25 action programs including specific policy reform measures, budgets and plans 
to be agreed, the complexity of the operation remains daunting to say the least, and the time-
frame quite unrealistic.  The section dealing with lessons from the past seems rather perfunctory 
and doesn’t deal at all with the lessons we have painstakingly learned in designing and 
implementing the kinds of policy and administrative reforms…either in Pakistan or in other parts 
of the world.”49 
 
 
“The project time table is so tight that it drives the proposed operation towards an enabling 
environment for “spending more” whereas the priority objective clearly is “spending more 
efficiently…In sum, an attractive project concept…which however, may not be feasible under the 
existing time table.”50   
 
 
“It is not correct to assume that improving the delivery of basic services…is necessarily an 
effective self-targeting mechanism for the poor… I see nothing…in the design of the overall 
project that would lead me to believe that project beneficiaries would necessarily be poor or 
reside in remote areas.  Weak provincial governments are likely to be less effective at providing 




Even firm proponents of the project, while ultimately pushing for Bank 
support, also flagged several concerns that such an ambitious, complex project 
                                                 
48 Memorandum from Gobind Nankani (SASVP) to John Wall (SA3PK) and Salem Gafisi 
(SA3PH), February 3, 1993. 
49 Memorandum from Martin Karcher (SA1PH) to Salem Gafisi (SA3PH), February 3, 1993. 
50 Memorandum from Adrian Verspoor (ESP) to John Wall (SA3PK), February 3, 1993. 
51 Memorandum from Valerie Kozel (SASVP) to Salem Gafisi (SA3PH) and John Wall (SA3PK), 
June 24, 1993. 
  20raised along the way.  The Bank staff charged with preparation of SAP-I 
characterized the Social Action Program concept as a “high-risk-high gain” 
opportunity.52   
 
A 1993 memorandum from the Pakistan Country Director to the Regional 
Vice President for South Asia read:     
 
“As you know, this has been a controversial project…The governments have 
made a good start but need to do a great deal more.  Many pitfalls still remain 
open.  The current political turmoil is an obvious one.  Another is the weak 
administrative set up.  The government’s poor track record and spotty 
compliance in all areas…is another.  The unprecedented nature of this approach, 
both from the donors’ standpoint and from that of the Governments, is yet 
another…We have dealt with some of the risks in the project design…If this 
approach does not work, we have the option of dropping the whole idea; or we 
might take another approach, based on what we learn from the first operation.”53 
 
When the project documentation for SAP-I was sent to the regional loan 
committee in August 1993, the members of the committee gave a green 
light to project staff to continue preparation for Board approval and 
eventual implementation of the SAP.  They did, however, voice a number 
of concerns: 
 
“The Committee recognized that this project took an unusual approach to 
addressing social sector development, was ambitious in its objectives and subject 
to a variety of risks.  The Committee urged candor on what can be achieved 
feasibly and a recognition that the basic goal is steady progress toward 
improving implementation of the entire program of delivering basic social 
services and not perfection in one investment project…The Committee cautioned 
that project monitoring would be the key to the success of this project.”54 
 
The issue, after the fact, is whether there might have been more attention to the 
overall design of SAP-I, taking into account these concerns.  For example, the 
effort to coordinate donor support in the form of a single large project was an 
attempt to secure leverage.  But the design of the project failed to build in 
mechanisms of leverage or monitoring of intermediate, measurable 
efforts/inputs.  Attention was paid to the need to gather and monitor data on 
changing social outcomes (in the form of important support for surveys of living 
standards), but that could not substitute for more timely measures of 
intermediate performance.   Though Government officials responsible for 
administering the SAP’s 27 subprograms each had to prepare periodic plans and 
reports, they were not in any way competing for scarce resources.  Indeed in the 
                                                 
52 Memorandum from Paul Isenman (Country Director) to Joseph Wood (SASVP), July 26, 1993. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Memorandum from John Wall to project personnel regarding the minutes of the Regional Loan 
Committee, August 6, 1993. 
  21early years when several lagged, the others who were ready with their plans 
actually had to wait for all to catch up before receiving funds.55   
 
Similarly, were there ways to simplify the components or otherwise limit 
the scope of risks?  The SAP design was cumbersome in its administrative 
requirements – both for the donors and for the federal and provincial 
governments.  According to documentation of the Bank’s negotiations with the 
Government when SAP-I was agreed to by both parties in early 1994,  the Bank 
“clarified that it would make every effort to simplify procedures for processing 
of SOEs to ensure expeditious processing for reimbursing claims.”56  We now 
know that that never took place.  Former officials familiar with the initial 
arrangements for reimbursement against statements of expenditure (SOEs) 
complain that the Bank and the donors brought in outside consultants to design 
an accounting system that was different from the local systems already in use, 
and created new demands, confusion, and delays.  In the words of the Bank, the 
cumbersome requirements to reimburse expenditures and reconcile accounting 
mechanisms “created an administrative nightmare” for government officials.57  
Might it have made sense to address selected components in selected provinces, 
instead of all four in all provinces?   
 
In addition, it may be the case, though this is difficult to judge today, that 
whatever ownership, understanding and commitment to the larger objective of 
the SAP existed at the federal level, was never acquired at the provincial level, 
and particularly not among political players in the provinces.58  The latter rely 
heavily on social programs as a source of political trading and patronage, in a 
system in which bureaucrats are both victims and partners in crime.  We wonder 
whether sufficient effort was put into obtaining the critical buy-in of provincial 
ministers – both in the finance and social program arms – either in preparation or 
during implementation, or whether the implications of insufficient interest were 
squarely faced.  Irrespective of provincial ownership, the Bank was unrealistic 
about the capacities and resources available at the provincial level to meet the 
desired targets and outcomes.  From the point of view of provincial resources, 
“the project was over-designed…and did not sufficiently account for limited 
                                                 
55 Conversation with World Bank staff.  
56 Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Social Action Program Project: Agreed Minutes of Negotiations, 
February 18, 1994. 
57 The World Bank, Pakistan Development Policy Review: A New Dawn?, April 3, 2002: 27. 
58 According to an audit done by the Asian Development Bank: “SAPP I was formulated largely 
at the federal level. Some consultation occurred with provinces but with insufficient real 
participation.  As a result, [provincial officials] had little ownership and while some provincial 
officials recognized the rationale for the program and the need for it, others felt that the federal 
Government and the foreign funding agencies imposed it on them.”  See Asian Development 
Bank, Project Performance Audit Report on the Social Action Program (Sector) Project in Pakistan, PPA: 
PAK 26017, November 2001: 17.  
  22provincial capacities and time required to bring about far-reaching institutional 
reform and behavioral change.”59  
 
  Without more discrete and fine-tuned mechanisms of leverage, and given 
the understandable bias toward disbursing (the next period will always be better; 
the last period was always especially difficult for government given fiscal 
pressures), it was almost preordained that resources would flow despite 
problems.  Table 6 contains excerpts from multiple donor supervision reports 
concerning the SAP from 1998-2000.  Each new report repeated the previous 
mission’s concerns that the SAP reform record was abysmal.  The government’s 
performance varied little from year to year, but nothing in the design of the 
project invited effective use of whatever leverage its large size and coordinated 
donor support was supposed to provide. 
 
Table 6: A False Sense of Optimism over SAP 
 
 
“The mission finds the overall performance in FY98 very disappointing.  The mission is 
concerned that the gap between the FY98 Operational Plans and actual performance is so large 
that it will be difficulty to come to agreement in July on plans for FY99 that are credible and 
realistic…progress in program implementation and policy reforms…has been very uneven…the 
mission is concerned that there is a serious lack of understanding of the SAP at various levels in 
the concerned departments.” 
-- Aide Memoire (May 19, 1998)  
 
“It is disappointing, after the considerable effort by all involved in government in preparing 
SAPP II, to formally report that the mission finds the overall implementation performance in 
FY98 far from satisfactory…the mission has found that the agreed benchmarks for ‘satisfactory 
progress’ incorporated in the credit agreement has not been met.  However, the mission 
concluded that, given the strong indications of commitment…the program can be brought back 
on track.” 
-- Aide Memoire Cover Letter to Government of Pakistan (June 18, 1998) 
 
“The mission is profoundly concerned that the progress of SAP is being severely jeopardized by 
the weaknesses in institutional capacity, the rapid, indiscriminate and disruptive transfer of key 
managers in all SAP departments…Assurances were sought and given, on the last mission and 
previously, that transfers would be minimized.  The mission is concerned to note that on the 
contrary transfers have continued and in some instances their frequency increased.” 
 
-- Aide Memoire (December 9, 1998) 
 
“The review team notes some improvements in the efforts to design and implement the SAP 
program.  However, the overall allocation of resources and focus of management attention is not 
yet sufficient to achieve the significant impact on service delivery that is sought by 
all…Government’s response to [recent audit reports] indicates growing commitment to 
                                                 
59 The World Bank, Implementation Completion Report for a Second Social Action Program Project, 
Report No: 26216, June 25, 2003: 4. 
  23improving accountability for expenditures on SAP and to take action where cases of corruption 
are identified.” 
-- Aide Memoire (May 17, 1999) 
 
“The mission was encouraged by the statements from both the Provincial and the Federal 
Governments confirming the overall priority accorded to the Social Action Program…however, 
the mission is concerned that the Government’s general commitment is not fully reflected in 
progress on the current year’s Operational Plans.” 
--Aide Memoire (February 23, 2000)  
 
“The Government…has reaffirmed its commitment to the people of Pakistan to improve the 
delivery of basic social services…[and] the Government has called for a revitalization of the 
Social Action Program’s efforts to improve service delivery…The progress is fragile and 
uneven…In general, implementing agencies do not have a stable capacity to design, plan, 
implement, and monitor improvements in policies and programs, nor are there signs that this 
capacity is being systematically developed…As a result, the programs that deliver basic social 
services are not improving at the pace necessary to meet the needs of Pakistan’s people, 
especially the poor” 
-- Aide Memoire (June 2, 2000) 
 
•  Implementation without adjustments 
 
Given the reasonable concern with documenting and tracking 
expenditures, annual operational plans for each of the 27 sub-programs at the 
provincial and federal levels were drawn up and administered by the relevant 
responsible government.  Supervision missions were unusually large, in part 
because all of the donors insisted on being represented, and focused on in depth 
critiques of the plans and detailed suggestions and demands for progress in the 
subsequent year.  The monitoring and evaluation tasks were so large that the 
donors created a stand-alone Multi-Donor Support Unit (MSU) in Islamabad to 
provide support for the monitoring, and coordination of the SAP.  The large 
missions were demanding, time consuming and expensive – and proved an 
additional burden on already weak administrative capacity of the implementing 
governments. 
 
According to the Bank’s Implementation Completion Report for SAP-II, 
the “rolling expenditure plans; financing and procurement plans for each sub-
program; process and institutional changes; new policies, instruments and 
innovations for service delivery improvements; and expenditure reimbursement 
mechanisms” made the implementation of SAP-II a daunting task that “was 
unnecessarily complicated for…provincial governments with hardly any 
experience or capacity.”60  In short, the SAP seems to have sapped administrative 
energies. Given the recurrent delays in financial disbursements from donors and 
                                                 
60  The World Bank, Implementation Completion Report for a Second Social Action Program Project, 
Report No: 26216, June 25, 2003: 5. 
  24the existence of considerable overlap between SAP and non-SAP programs, local 
government officials were often left with the impression that the SAP lacked any 
additionality (ironically undermining whatever idea of leverage initially 
envisioned by the Bank). 
 
Apart from its complexity and ambition, the SAP was also narrowly 
focused on the quantitative expansion of social services.  Issues of quality, 
demand, and participation were reported on and discussed but did not affect 
disbursements.61  An evaluation of SAP-I prepared for the Government of 
Netherlands claimed that “focus groups interviewed for the World Bank ICR 
[Implementation Completion Report]…were of the opinion that too much 
emphasis had been put on quantitative and financial targets and not enough on 
the quality of delivery or on the policy reforms.”62         
 
 Research in Pakistan, some sponsored by the Bank and some undertaken 
by other groups, had convincingly demonstrated that the issues of quality and 
quantity cannot be de-linked.  It was clear from this analytical work that parental 
demand for education – determined in part by the quality of education and 
community participation – can influence enrollments. This work also suggested 
that the demand for private sector education was rapidly growing and that per-
student expenditures could actually be lower in some cases for private schools.  
Some of these insights were eventually reflected in the poverty work and the 
related economic and sector work done by Bank staff throughout the 1990s.  
However, for the most part, they did not prompt any adjustments to the SAP (or 
other ongoing education projects) throughout the period of implementation.   
 
The SAP, as suggested above, is an example of how easily social sector 
interventions can be hijacked by governance failures.  Though the Bank’s pre-
SAP appraisals concluded that “there is no immediate need for a separate project 
to build institutional capacity,”63 the performance of the SAP was significantly 
and consistently hampered by weak capacity of public institutions responsible 
for social service delivery.  The implementation failures were rampant – 
manifested in non-merit recruitment of staff, absenteeism of teachers and 
doctors, and frequent transfers of essential staff.  According to one third-party 
                                                 
61 An audit conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) reached a similar conclusion.  It 
argued that SAP’s “reimbursement mechanism of rewarding incremental expenditure was an 
incentive to use more inputs rather than produce better results.”  See Asian Development Bank, 
Project Performance Audit Report on the Social Action Program (Sector) Project in Pakistan, PPA: PAK 
26017, November 2001: 37. 
62 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Netherlands, Gender Equity in Education in Pakistan: 
Evaluation of the education component of Social Action Program Project I (SAPP I), 1999, 
http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/PAK_99-800_Part1.pdf.  
63 Memorandum from John Wall to project personnel regarding the Initial Executive Project 
Summary of SAP I, October 29, 1992. 
  25evaluation of the SAP, during 1993-2000 Balochistan had 13 different Secretaries 
of Education, averaging 5.7 months on the job before being transferred; and 
during the same period, the Government of Punjab had 14 different Secretaries of 
Public Health Engineering. 
 
That politicians used staff recruitment, construction contracts, and site 
selection for schools and clinics to enrich their kith and kin is reported in SAP 
supervision reports and independent field surveys.  A reading of the (many and 
lengthy) supervision reports for SAP-I suggests that Bank staff and the other 
donors were fully aware of, and indeed plagued by, their understanding of these 
implementation problems.  But in the absence of clear rules for whether and how 
to stop disbursements (and perhaps fearing accusations of a lack of consistency 
across provinces), there was little they could do beyond highlighting and 
haranguing.  As time passed by, their concerns were more explicitly incorporated 
as objectives in the CAS Progress reports.64 And following on the experiences of 
SAP-I, the second phase of SAP placed a greater emphasis on issues of 
governance, quality, and community/NGO participation. But during SAP-II as 
well, in the absence of explicit and agreed-upon indicators defining acceptable 
performance, the tendency was to hope for improvement in the next period, 
maintain engagement, and continue disbursing.  
 
Though the Bank became more alert to governance issues affecting the 
SAP each year, its view of “governance” remained narrow and technocratic.  The 
emphasis was on concern about financial transparency and procurement reform.  
By the time of SAP-II there is also more discussion of the need to implement 
agreed promises to reduce staff turnover and politically driven site selection of 
new construction, and to make operational such ideas as restricting local teacher 
appointments to local merit lists.  But there is also no sign of straightforward 
“triggers” for exit from the program in each province or other unit, if progress 
could not be shown.   
 
There is also convincing evidence, from the Bank’s own supervision 
assessments and external evaluations, that NGO or community participation in 
the implementation of SAP was minimal in both SAP-I and SAP-II.65  Under the 
SAP framework, the Participatory Development Program (PDP) was supposed to 
                                                 
64 The Bank’s 1995 CAS cites an important feature of its support in the social sectors as 
“improving governance by, inter alia, emphasizing the application of objective criteria for hiring 
and posting staff, selecting sites for services, improving financial and management information 
system, and strengthening performance-based staff rules.”  See The World Bank, Pakistan 
Country Assistance Strategy, 1995: 14. 
65 According to several people both inside and outside of the Government of Pakistan, one of the 
initial designs of the Social Action Program dictated that all assistance would be channeled 
through NGOs, such as the National Rural Support Program.   
  26be the primary vehicle for promoting the role of civil society and NGOs for 
improving both the delivery and quality of social services.  Yet according to the 
Bank’s own documents, this component of the SAP never fully materialized.  
During SAP-I, partnerships with community groups “were often superficial” and 
“others existed on paper or were empty formalities.”66  As for SAP-II, the 
participatory development component “proved to be a non-viable mechanism to 
foster community and NGO participation… PDP was an initiative imposed by 
donors with little support at the provincial level…communities were not seen as 
key partners in the process.”67  The SAP-II Mid-Term Review stated that “While 
community participation was identified is SAPP2 as a vehicle for both resource 
management and social service delivery, there was little early conceptualization 
or analysis of what this meant in practice, and no formulation of guidelines or 
any implementation strategy.”68 
 
The problem appears to have been resistance, within the provincial 
departments and ministries, to implementing any program outside the 
bureaucratic system (as was the case in many other countries).   Though the 
problem is highlighted, it is not clear that any particular adjustment within the 
SAP was ever explicitly considered.  Yet, at a very basic level, the SAP did result 
in a larger policy shift toward community involvement and civil society 
participation.  Despite the dearth of immediate results, available evidence does 
point to potentially significant attitudinal changes within the Government of 
Pakistan vis-à-vis civil society.  Beginning in 1999, the Bank began direct support 
for NGO-managed programs via the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Funds I and II 
(described in the Appendix D).   
 
In the end, in the face of persistent implementation difficulties and the 
new government’s decentralization strategy, the Bank’s final recourse was to 
divert the remaining money in SAP-II to federal programs.  The Bank’s Mid-
Term Review (MTR) of SAP-II noted Pakistan’s lack of progress toward the pre-
agreed project objectives: “Overall, it appears that despite the Social Action 
Program and complimentary sector investment projects, improvements in 
service delivery are either not happening, or occurring at a very slow pace.”69  
Coupled with the government’s decision to shift service delivery responsibility 
to the local, rather than provincial, levels, the Bank decided to restructure the 
                                                 
66 The World Bank, Implementation Completion Report for Social Action Program Project, Report No: 
18043, 1998: 9. 
67 The World Bank, Implementation Completion Report for a Second Social Action Program Project, 
Report No: 26216, June 25, 2003: 9. 
68 The World Bank, SAPP2 Mid Term Review: Report on the Community Participation Component of 
SAPP2, October 2000. 
69 The World Bank, “Social Action Program/SAP II Mid Term Review,” Draft MTR Discussion 
Note for the SAPP II Wrap Up Meeting, October 23, 2000. 
  27project in fiscal year 2002 and restrict project support to federal programs, which 
had achieved greater progress and were unaffected by decentralization.  At the 
request of the government, the Bank also made available a portion of the 
remaining SAP-II money for emergency drought relief assistance.  Then in June 
2002, at the request of Government, IDA agreed to end disbursements and close 
the project.70  By that time, frustrations had been mounting on both sides to the 
point where neither party sought to continue implementation of SAP-II.  
 
In the final analysis, the SAP did entail some (perhaps intangible) benefits 
– though whether these gains were worth billions of dollars in taxpayer money is 
arguable. The SAP appears to have raised public awareness of social sector issues 
and solicited greater official commitment towards social sector development.  It 
has also generated rich lessons for the reform of social service delivery in 
Pakistan. 
 
At a broader level, the fact that the SAP consistently fell short of its 
objectives is easy to understand. The SAP was based on an incomplete 
understanding of Pakistan’s social and political context.  For example, an 
evaluation of gender equity in education in Pakistan stated the following:   
 
When analyzing the design of SAP a weak point seems to be the underpinning of 
the plans. There is no situational analysis on the sector and on gender issues in 
the SAR [Staff Appraisal Report], and targets appear to come out of the blue sky, 
being rather a result of wishful thinking than of realistic planning.   Several 
reform measures seem to be introduced on a trial-by-doing basis instead of on 
the basis of careful analysis about their possibilities.71  
 
Perhaps the most astonishing feature of the SAP years was the Bank’s 
inability to internalize lessons learned.  Given the scale of the problems 
experienced under SAP-I, the Bank proceeded to give the project a “satisfactory” 
rating in its Implementation Completion Report (ICR).  To some Bank staff, this 
was unconscionable.  Table 7, which provides excerpts of one Bank staff 
member’s reaction to an initial draft of the ICR, demonstrates how well known 
SAP’s shortcomings were. 
                                                 
70 The World Bank, Second Social Action Program Project Implementation Completion Report, Report 
No: 26216, June 25, 2003: 3-4. 
71 The World Bank, Education reforms in Balochistan, 1990-1998—a case study in improving 
management and gender equity in primary education, September 30, 1999: p. 26. 
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Though [SAP I] was the most dramatic effort in Pakistan this decade I have not seen much 
debate about this important ICR…My basic impression is that the ICR struggles to put a brave 





One can hardly question that Pakistan needs to spend more resources better on its social sectors.  
But merely raising the expenditure level is in itself not an assurance that outcomes will improve, 
particularly in a system characterized by endemic corruption.  Indeed it may be counter-




Appropriateness of the SAPP Mechanism 
 
In hindsight the appropriateness of a policy-based operation like SAPP into an environment 
characterized by weak implementation capacity, systemic governance problems, no timely 
outcome monitoring system and very limited ownership of program objectives is doubtful.  
Experience has shown that such operations only work when ownership is strong and the 
reforms are executed before financing is made available. 
 
The complexity of the operation itself, the incompatibility of SAPP requirements with regular 
government procedures, and the novelty of many of its features to government officials, 





In my view, one of the major shortcomings of SAPP was precisely that it required dealing with 
every issue.  There is no way the Bank can keep abreast of every sectoral issue, and one of the 





A major lesson is also that the Bank needs to stick to agreements made and not yield to pressure 




SAP-I’s design and implementation woes were well known, but were 
neither adequately internalized by senior Bank officials nor properly fed into the 
                                                 
72 E-mail from Ivar J. Anderson to John Wall regarding SAP I Implementation Completion 
Report, May 22, 1998. 
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planning process for SAP-II, which to no one’s surprise, encountered many of the 
same problems as its predecessor.  In 2000, the Multi-Donor Support Unit 
performed an analysis of third party validations (TPV) of SAP-II extending from 
July 1997 to June 1999.  Its results confirmed that the governance problems 
highlighted under SAP-I continued to plague the effective implementation of 
SAP-II: “According to the TPV results, out of the four governance areas [site 
selection, procurement, recruitment, and absenteeism], only site selection has 
show improvements in the last three years.”73   
 
Injecting vast sums of money through a dysfunctional system was 
unlikely to be successful.  Under circumstances of elite capture and 
misgovernance, more money may not necessarily buy social development. “The 
emphasis of SAPP-II on enhanced allocations, and releases and expenditures 
appear to have been misplaced,” concludes the 2001 annual report of the Multi-
Donor Support Unit, “as it has yet to produce the desired improved service 
delivery and any major outcomes.”74   
 
Phase I: The other loans 
 
After 1993, the size of the SAP loans, the leadership the Bank assumed for 
supervision of the overall program supported by many donors (including the 
senior staffing of the Multi-Donor Support Unit in Pakistan), and the ambitious 
scope and objectives reflected in the SAP approach, took up the bulk of the 
Bank’s staff support, and seems to have been the overriding focus of its dialogue 
on social issues in Pakistan.  (In the period 1994-2003, Bank commitments 
amounted to $450 million for the two SAP loans, and $160 million for four other 
loans.)  During 1993-2000, the Bank also made six new loans of the traditional 
project type (three in education, two in health, and one in population).  (In 1999, 
the Bank approved a loan to support transfers to nongovernmental organizations 
from a new Poverty Alleviation Fund.  We discuss this loan below under “Phase 
II”, where it belongs in concept if not in its actual date of approval).  Table 8 
shows these six loans, plus three others of the same stand-alone type that were 
under supervision in the mid and late 1990s. 
 
 
73 Multi-donor Support Unit for the Social Action Programme, Social Action Programme Third Party 
Validation: Analysis of the Last Three Rounds, Governance Issues, August 2000. 
74 Multi-donor Support Unit for the Social Action Programme, Annual Report 2001: 4.  Table 8: Phase One (non-SAP) loans, 1993-1999 
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1996                         Northern
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26.7 18.0 Closed S L M S L M S UNC M
1998                    Northern
Education 
22.8 13.2 Active  N/A  N/A  N/
A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/AIn retrospect it is notable that these projects had what might be called 
acceptable performance.  For the most part, they were rated as satisfactory with 
reasonable likelihood of some institutional impact and some sustainability.  For 
the most part, our judgment is similar, except on sustainability which in 2004/5 
after several more years, we judge at best “uncertain” and probably negligible.  
Our reasoning is that the kinds of problems that plague the delivery systems in 
general, are mitigated during the execution phase of Bank-supported projects 
because of the outside attention, but cannot be sustained beyond the project 
period, once the ongoing attention and outside scrutiny ends.   
 
In fact, certain components of the health and education projects were 
successful.  In education, programs that emphasized teacher training and text 
book development were implemented and reasonably effective.  In health, the 
training programs included in the Family Health II loan were viewed by current 
officials as very important (though they ended when the “project” was 
completed), and the incorporation of preventive programs into the provincial 
administrative functions—e.g. immunizations—has been sustained though 
immunization coverage remains far from complete. 
 
The population (family planning) project was managed at the federal 
level, where a separate ministry and a strong results-oriented culture inherited 
from the 1980s seem to prevail.  The project was managed effectively.  The 
question of what is meant by sustainability in this case is a difficultone, however, 
most family planning information and services are more efficiently delivered 
when integrated into basic health services, certainly from the point of view of 
women users; and a successfully federally managed program, even though 
decentralized, will be with delivery systems that are financed and administered 
at the provincial level.   
 
Notwithstanding these successes, the sustainability of these projects is an 
issue.  In general, project sustainability was high when: there was sufficient 
government commitment, the projects were well aligned with official objectives, 
fiscal sustainability existed, and subsequent donor commitment was ensured. 
Several sub-components of the non-SAP health and education projects were 
particularly successful. These included, for instance, teacher training, textbook 
development, family planning and immunization elements of the programs.  
 
The Bank projects in the health and education sectors shared some of the 
same problems encountered by the SAP projects, including: excessive ambition, 
weak implementation capacity, frequent transfer of critical management-level 
staff and political interference.  Project delays were common due to a general 
lack of familiarity with the Bank’s accounting systems, managerial inefficiencies, 
budgetary crises, reimbursement delays from the Bank, and prolonged bans on official recruitment. In the health and family planning programs, there were also 
several incidents of misprocurement. As with the SAP, the commitment to 
involve NGOs and community groups was more rhetorical than substantial.  
 
What was the overall impact of the traditional projects in the 1990s?  Bank 
staff answered the question implicitly in their ambitious (and ex ante reasonable) 
emphasis on the need and the centrality of the SAP.  Though the traditional 
projects fared better than the SAPs overall, it is clear that Bank staff saw a need 
for something bigger, more visible, and with it was hoped more leverage—
because modest success with selected components of traditional projects was not 
adding up to the change in the overall priorities of the government nor 
contributing to fundamental institution-building. 
 
Table 9 provides selective but representative detail on some of these 
projects as well as on the SAPs.   
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Table 9: Health and Education — A Balance Sheet of Progress and Setbacks 
 
Social Action Program 
Progress  Setbacks 
  Contraceptive prevalence increased from 7% 
in 1990-91 to 17% in 1998-99.  
  The percentage of deliveries conducted by 
qualified personnel in Pakistan increased 
from 45 percent in 1990-91 to 61 percent in 
1998-99. 
  Contraceptive use among married women 
increased from 24% in 1996/7 to28% in 2001 
  The infant mortality rate declined from 89 per 
1000 births in 1998 to 82% per 1000 births in 
2002. 
 
  Primary gross enrolment rates for boys 
decreased from 81% 1995 to 78% in 1999. 
female enrolment stagnated at 60%.  
  Against a target of universal immunization 
coverage by the end of 1990’s, only less than 
50 per cent of 1 year olds were fully 
immunized by the end of the decade. 
  Total SAP allocations declined from 2.3% of 
GDP in 1997 to only 1.8% of GDP. 
 
NWFP Primary Education Project 
  Total project enrolment increased by 
309,000 during the project period, 
including a 36% increase in female 
enrolments 
  From 1995-2000, the project was able to 
produce and supply more than 10.9 
million subsidized textbooks and 
workbooks based on integrated core 
curriculum 
  In the two program districts 34% and 46% 
of teachers demonstrated pupil-
centered/active behaviors, while only 4% 
of such behavior was found in the non-
program schools 
  The project was rated as unsatisfactory 
in improving organizational framework 
  The rate of dropouts increased from an 
average of about 8% in 1994-95 to 12% in 
1998-99. 
  Village level beneficiary involvement 
was thought to have a sustainability 
issue. The pilot activities were not yet   
absorbed into the government system 
 
Northern Health Program Project 
  The number of female paramedics has 
risen by more than 70% and the coverage 
of community based services increased 
from 52 to 62% of the population 
  Immunization coverage of children has 
shown little improvement: in 1999 the 
proportion of fully immunized children 
was 40% in AJK and NA, against a 
project target of 60% 
Family Health Project 
  The contraceptive prevalence rate has 
risen from 8.6% to 18.7% in NWFP and 
from 12.4% to 23.4% in Sindh 
  Coverage of antenatal care through 
qualified  providers has doubled in rural 
NWFP rising from 14% in the early 
nineties to 28% in 1996-97. 
 
  Although immunization coverage has 
increased over the duration of the 
project it is far short of universal 
coverage 
  In Sindh only 52% of the primary health 
care facilities have female paramedics 
despite more than a two-fold increase in 
their number over the life of the project 
 
Source: World Bank Implementation Completion Reports. 
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Phase II: Devolution, NGOs, and the SACs 
 
Phase Two of the Bank’s involvement in Pakistan’s social sectors roughly 
coincided with the advent of the Musharraf government in October 1999.  The 
Bank’s lending portfolio in Phase Two was made up of three, distinct 
components.   The first consisted of three relatively small health and education 
projects which were funded at the federal level.  These loans ($60.7 million, or 8 
percent of all Phase Two loans) are a continuation of the types of federal 
programs the Bank funded toward the end of Phase One, when it restricted all 
support to federal programs following decentralization and an acknowledgment 
of the flagging progress of the provincially-based programs.  By all accounts, the 
three national programs (HIV/AIDS, Polio eradication, National Education 
Assessment) have received high marks from senior Government officials as well 
as Bank staff.    
 
The second component represents the Bank’s support for the Pakistan 
Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), a micro-credit initiative developed by the 
government.  The first tranche of support for the PPAF (roughly $90 million) was 
approved in 1999.  While the project’s first phase is scheduled to come to an end 
in December 2004, its success has been widely heralded by the Bank and the 
Pakistani development community.  In fact, its success has already prompted a 
second tranche of Bank support two and a half times the size of the initial loan 
($238 million).  The combined total of $328 million represents 43 percent of Phase 
Two loan commitments).  Support for the PPAF is a reasonable strategy for the 
Bank—one that goes around the problems of governance that undermined the 
SAP loans, by channeling funds directly into the hands of local NGOs who can 
have an impact at the community level.   
 
The final component of the Bank’s Phase Two lending is a set of structural 
adjustment credits (SACs) implemented at the provincial level.  These loans 
(which account for 50 percent of Phase Two loan commitments) were established 
in three provinces (NWFP, Punjab, and Sindh) and portend the core of the Bank’s 
lending strategy in the years ahead.   
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Table 10: Phase Two loans, 1999-2004 
 
          ICR Rating for 
Fiscal 
Year 




Status Outcome Sustainability  IDI 
1999 PPAF-I  90  62.6  Active N/A  N/A  N/A 
2002 Sindh  SAC  100  100  Closed  S  L  M 





3.6 N/A  Active  N/A  N/A  N/A 
2003 Partnership  for 
Polio Eradication 




37.1 N/A  Active  N/A  N/A  N/A 
2004 PPAF-II  238  N/A  Active N/A  N/A  N/A 




100 100  Closed  N/A N/A  N/A 
2004  NWFP SAC II  90  N/A  Active  N/A  N/A  N/A 
 
•  Provincial Structural Adjustment Credits (SACs) 
 
In the post-SAP phase, the Bank has continued its support for the 
Government’s poverty reduction strategy through the introduction of a new 
lending instrument – the Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC).  SACs are 
intended to provide budgetary support to provincial governments for a 
comprehensive reform program, ranging from macroeconomic and governance 
reforms to improvements in social service delivery (see Table 6).  Negotiated 
with each province on an individual basis, the SACs are set up as a series of 
single-year loans under a single “program” renewed annually based on 
performance in the core reform areas.  The Bank has approved SACs for three 
provinces: NWFP, Punjab, and Sindh.  As an illustrative example, Table 11 lists a 
sampling of the Bank’s conditionality for the first NWFP credit, issued in 2002. 
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Table 11: Sample Conditionality of NWFP SAC I (2002)75 
 
Entry Triggers 
  There is a reforming government with committed “reform champions” 
  Initiated good governance reforms 
  Fiscal discipline 
  Improved  performance of Financial Management Committees 
  Civil service reform 
  Improvement in civil service delivery 
 
Outcomes  Prior Actions Taken  Indicative Triggers for Follow-
up Operation 
I. Strengthening Accountability and Professionalism of State Institutions 
  Devolution reforms    Ban on new recruitment 
  Restructuring of 
departments 
  Annual review of 
restructuring and staff 
rationalization 
  Promoting merit and 
professionalization of civil 
service 





  Computerize HR database; 
reduce recruitment time; 
pilot contract-based 
employment 
II. Education and Health Sector Reforms 
  Education reforms    Introduce teacher 
absenteeism monitoring; 
approve program to 
recruit 2000 primary 
teachers 




III. Improving Fiscal Sustainability and Restoring Financial Accountability 
  Improve development 
effectiveness of 
expenditures and fiscal 
discipline 
  Introduce agriculture 
income tax; reduce wheat 
subsidy; rationalize total 
number of taxes 
  Implementation of FY03 
budget consistent with 
enhanced social 
expenditures; tax 
rates/policy revised  
IV. Promoting Growth  
  Improve business 
environment 
  Establish deregulation 










  Reversal of social sector/governance reforms 
  Substantial borrowing to finance deficit 
  Expansion of public sector contingent liabilities 
 
                                                 
75 This is a sample list and, therefore, is incomplete.  For a comprehensive listing of 
conditionalities, see The World Bank, Structural Adjustment Credit for NWFP Program Document, 
Report No. 24188-PAK, May 31, 2002. 
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government in response to reform in the education sector.  Unlike SACs in 
NWFP and Sindh, the Punjab loan is exclusively geared toward education 
reform; thus, the conditionality is solely focused on education benchmarks and 
outcomes.  The Bank decision to focus narrowly on the education sector in 
Punjab was probably due to the fact that the Asian Development Bank had 
already launched a provincial SAC in Punjab.  In addition, some Bank officials 
claim they found champions for education reform at the provincial level with 
whom they could work on an ambitious reform agenda and they moved to 
exploit the opportunity.76  
 
The stated purpose of the Punjab Education Reform Adjustment Credit is 
to provide financing for implementation of “a wide-ranging reform agenda to 
improve fiscal management, promote devolution and improve service delivery 
starting with education.”  The first of three (potential) credits – each of which 
amounts to $100 million – was approved in February 2004 and is due to close in 
September 2004.  If the Bank determines that Punjab has fulfilled its 
commitments, it will issue a second credit; but if Punjab falls behind, the Bank 
can withhold the second credit until Punjab’s performance improves or 
discontinue support altogether. 
 
In fact, this has already taken place in Sindh and NWFP.   The second 
credit for Sindh has been indefinitely postponed due to the borrower’s poor 
reform record.  Much of that poor record can be blamed on the sub-optimal 
political alignment in Sindh where political tensions between the districts, where 
the opposition to the military (such as the Pakistan People’s Party) still has some 
influence, and the provincial government, where the pro-Musharraf parties hold 
sway, have stymied reform efforts.  In NWFP, the second credit was approved 
only in June 2004, after a several month delay due to NWFP’s failure to meet 
mutually agreed-upon outcomes.  While NWFP’s achievement of objectives 
under the first SAC was rated “satisfactory” by the Bank, its follow-on program 
had not fully met the Bank’s indicative triggers for the second SAC.77  The slow 
progress in NWFP was also partially the result of increasing political tensions 
between the provincial and district governments. 
 
                                                 
76 One of the first policy announcements made by the new Punjab Government was their 
intention to make education completely cost-free until the 10th grade.  In addition, the Punjab 
Government is the most aligned provincial Government in Pakistan, at the political and 
bureaucratic levels, making it particularly attractive to such an investment.  See The World Bank, 
“Summary of Comments and Discussions during the Punjab Education Sector Adjustment 
Program IM Review Meeting,” September 15, 2003. 
77 The World Bank, NWFP SAC Implementation Completion Report, Report No. 25157, June 19, 2003. 
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assessment of this report is preliminary and based only on initial impressions.  
On the plus side, implicit in the design of the SACs is recognition of the Bank’s 
“difficulty of exit” during the SAP period.  In contrast to the SAP, the single-year 
SAC loans make exit the easier default if a program is not working.  Because 
money is disbursed under separate single-year loans, the Bank can exercise 
leverage by stopping funds in response to poor government performance (as was 
done in Sindh) and re-starting funds once the reform program gets back on track 
(as was done in NWFP).   
 
Another potential advantage of the SACs is that by creating the much-
needed fiscal space for financially constrained provinces, the SACs can help to 
keep social sectors on the policy agenda (though this, of course, was also the 
primary motivating idea behind the SAP).  More importantly, the SACs have 
played an important role in extending and deepening the reforms identified by 
previous social sector interventions, such as the SAP.  Thus, the education 
components of the SACs are extending the policy areas of the SAP by 
emphasizing facility-based recruitment, regularizing the status of School 
Management Committees (SMCs), and issues of public-private partnership and 
quality. In the health sector, the SACs have emphasized the continuance of the 
Lady Health Worker’s program (LHW).  
 
Since the SACs are annually reviewed, the Bank has, in principle, greater 
leverage to influence the Government. There is evidence that in some cases, it 
made use of this leverage—an important example being the NWFP SAC, where 
the Bank delayed the approval of a second credit until performance improved.  
  
But, the SACs carry significant risks as well. The money channeled to 
provinces is more fungible than is the case with conventional projects.  This has 
the advantage of focusing all parties’ assessments on actual performance and 
results—as opposed to accounting for expenditures or other intermediate 
outcomes.  It has the disadvantage inherent in limited experience on the part of 
the Bank on what are reasonable measures of “performance” or “results” within 
short single-year periods.  Because assistance flows directly to the provincial 
finance departments, the Bank could once again be essentially processing money 
through an inefficient system – a factor responsible for the failure of earlier social 
sector interventions.  
 
The financial assistance provided through the SACs can also be politically 
misused – either by being spent on non-priority areas and/or simply through 
corruption. Here, the financial transparency at the provincial and district levels is 
likely to be an important determinant of the success of SACs.  In Sindh, for 
instance, non-merit recruitment of teachers conducted through means other than 
  39Provincial Public Service Commissions persists.  In Punjab, the members of the 
provincial assembly continue to interfere in the prioritization of education 
projects, the selection of school sites, and the investments made in basic 
infrastructure. 
 
The tense relations between some provincial and district governments 
highlight the risk that increased financial support for social sectors may not get 
translated into efficient provision of social services. More money injected into the 
provincial financial pool does not necessarily mean that financial resources will 
actually be released to district governments that are directly responsible for the 
delivery of services. In provinces where relations between the provincial 
governments and the district governments are stressed (such as Sindh) the 
release of development funds to the districts could be considerably delayed or – 
even denied.  
  
A broader critique of the provincial SAC approach is that—as with earlier 
Bank programs – the design does not take into account the difficult political 
economy problems described above and so starkly highlighted by the experience 
of 1990s.  The term “governance” has become part of the Bank’s development 
lexicon and “improving governance” is a key plank of the reform strategy in all 
three SACs – but the objective is narrowly defined in terms of “quality of the 
public expenditure program”, “greater transparency and accountability”, “civil 
service reform”, and the like.  
 
Under the SAP, the donors instituted a complex and cumbersome process 
that was marked by an over-emphasis on statements of expenditure (SOEs) and a 
never-ending set of bureaucratic procedures.  With the advent on provincial 
SACs, the Bank has moved to the opposite extreme: direct budget support to the 
provinces that hinges on a set of prior actions and benchmarks.  The former is 
characterized by donor micromanagement and the latter is, perhaps, too flexible 
(although the Bank’s stance vis-à-vis NWFP and Sindh is encouraging in this 
respect).   
 
•  Devolution 
 
The three components of the Bank’s “Phase Two” lending strategy have 
been implemented in the context of devolution, the Musharraf government’s 
move to decentralize power away from the provinces toward newly created local 
administrative structures.  Similar to previous local government schemes 
promoted by Pakistan’s military leaders, Musharraf’s “Devolution of Power 
Plan” called for re-establishing elected councils at the district and sub-district 
  40levels.78  Under this plan, local governments were to be elected in a non-partisan 
fashion (in fact, political parties were officially banned from participating) in 
phased elections over a period of nine months, beginning in December 2000.  
Administrative powers were also to be devolved from the provinces to district 
governments. 
 
To implement this decentralization plan, Musharraf established the 
National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) in Islamabad, initially headed by General 
Tanvir Naqvi.  NRB drafted a “Local Government Ordinance” that each of 
Pakistan’s four provinces was subsequently ordered to adopt as its own law.  
The Local Government Ordinance (LGO) called for the creation of three new 
local levels of government: the union council (to be directly elected by the 
people), the tehsil (comprised of union council nazims or mayors), and the district 
council (comprised of tehsil nazims). The representatives of the latter two, unlike 
the union council, are indirectly elected.  As part of the devolution reform, 6,455 
new indirectly elected local governments were created. 
 
Of the many changes brought about by devolution, two deserve to be 
highlighted.  First, the devolution plan abolished old power structures and 
created the post of district coordinating officer (DCO), charged with overseeing 
all administrative procedures at the district level.  This change had the practical 
effect of subordinating the elite civil service district management group (DMG) 
to the new district administrator.  Prior to devolution, the DMG virtually 
controlled all aspects of district administration.  Many critics saw this weakening 
of the civil service as a deliberate power play perpetrated by military officials in 
Islamabad who sought to expand military control at the local levels.79     
 
Second, the devolution plan instituted a quota system ensuring minimal 
representation of women among union councils.  The union council, the only 
directly elected local body, is comprised of a chairman and 26 councillors.  
According to the devolution blueprint, 50 percent of the union council seats were 
to be reserved for women.  Along the way, as the plan was refined, that 
percentage was reduced to 33 percent.80  Nonetheless, under devolution, women 
are given an unprecedented voice in politics.  Yet it is too early to tell what 
practical impact this is having.  While government and NGO officials are 
implementing plans to educate the thousands of women councilors, according to 
one Pakistani government official a large percentage of them are illiterate and 
                                                 
78 Musharraf’s devolution plan is reminiscent of similar plans implemented by his military 
predecessor Ayub Khan and Zia ul-Haq, both of whom instituted lower tiers of government as a 
way of consolidating their power under the aegis of democratization.  See International Crisis 
Group, Devolution in Pakistan: Reform of Regression, Asia Report No. 77, March 22, 2004. 
79 Ibid, 7. 
80 Ibid, 10. 
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women possess leadership positions within the new tiers of local government.  
According to the International Crisis Group, out of Pakistan’s 101 districts, only 
two nazims (mayors) are women.81 
 
Many Bank documents towards the end of the review period have 
recognized the potential risks and opportunities inherent in the devolution 
program.  First, administrative capacity at the local level is grossly inadequate. 
There is a greater need for developing better understanding of the institutional 
inadequacies at the local level.  Second, the empowerment of local communities 
may not be possible without disempowering the local elites. In the presence of 
asymmetric structures of power at the local level, decentralization of 
administrative powers may make things worse for the poor. In a society with an 
entrenched rural elite, the devolution of power suffers from the risk of elite- or 
feudal-capture and is likely to reinforce existing power structures and strengthen 
rural inequalities. Already, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, there is 
evidence that the “rural gentry” captured 70% of the seats in local elections in 
December 2000. 82 Analysis from independent surveys confirm that land 
ownership and beraderi (clan) appeared critical for explaining electoral success. 
Quantitative analysis from surveys in selected districts reveals that the average 
landholding of the winning candidate was six times more than that of the losing 
candidate.  Furthermore, 82% of the candidates contesting the nazim (mayor) seat 
and 73% contesting a general seat indicated land as their primary source of 
income.83  
 
Second, even though the administrative powers have been devolved to the 
local level, political powers still remain highly centralized.  There is a common 
belief among independent analysts that the devolution plan was politically 
motivated, designed to consolidate power for the military regime rather than to 
deepen democracy.  One report argues that “devolution…has proved little more 
than a cover for further centralized control over the lower levels of 
government…the military is far more interested in political manipulation than 
political devolution.”84  The systematic exclusion of political parties from 
contesting local government elections reinforced the impression that the 
                                                 
81 Ibid, 14. 
82 Quoted in William Easterly, “The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case 
Study of Pakistan,” Paper for the Analytical Narratives of Growth Project, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, June 2001. 
83 The surveys were conducted by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in 
Islamabad. For a summary of findings, see, Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Pakistan Under Musharraf: 
Economic Reform and Political Change, Vanguard Publishers, 2004.  
84  For a detailed articulation of this view, see International Crisis Group, Devolution in Pakistan: 
Reform of Regression, Asia Report No. 77, March 22, 2004. 
  42devolution reform was merely an exercise in self-perpetuation of the military 
rule.    
 
Third, devolution has given local governments responsibility without 
much authority. For instance, local governments lack powers for local taxation. 
The provincial governments still retain many important roles, including the 
provision of critical infrastructure (e.g. irrigation and infrastructure) and the 
responsibility for fiscal transfers.  The devolution reforms cannot be viewed in 
isolation from the broader issue of provincial autonomy.  Thus, the success of 
local governments also depends on reforms in provincial governments, which 
suffer from low tax capacity and dependence on the center for funds (federal 
transfers account for 80% of provincial resources).85  There is stiff resistance on 
the part of provincial governments to relinquish their own limited authority (and 
power over jobs and contracts).   
 
The Bank is of two minds as far as devolution is concerned.  Its overall 
response to the devolution initiative has been ambivalent – confined to a verbal, 
rather than proactive support.  The World Bank’s ambivalence is perhaps best 
captured in the 2004 CAS Progress Report:  
 
While there has been considerable progress in implementation during the first 18 
months of the CAS, it was also recognized that the process of institutionalizing 
the new roles and responsibilities of the various levels of government will be 
lengthy and challenging. The federal, provincial and local governments are re-
thinking various aspects of devolution. In this context, it is important for the 
Bank and other donors not only to be careful to support devolution as it takes 
shape (e.g., through district capacity building and support for financial 
management improvements), but also to ensure that their interventions do not 
contradict the devolved environment and encourage the still nascent system to 
improve local service delivery while addressing urgent service delivery 
priorities.86   
 
Rhetorically speaking, the Bank has supported the devolution initiative.  It 
has hailed the devolution reform as an important opportunity for the delivery of 
social services and better accountability of the government and service providers.  
Yet, the Bank has also wisely recognized some of the risks contained in the 
devolution plan.  On the one hand, the Bank argues that devolution offers 
significant potential for social sector reform, yet its lack of programmatic support 
for devolution implies that it is still unsure about the staying power and popular 
benefits of the plan: “While there are early signs that devolution is beginning to 
                                                 
85 The World Bank, Report No. 24193-PAK, 28 May 2002. 
86 See The World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report, April 28, 2004. 
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delivery in the districts…it is also clear that much remains to be done.”87   
 
The Bank’s ambivalent stance is contrasted by the proactive roles major 
donors such as DFID, UNDP, or the ADB have played in promoting devolution.  
UNDP, in particular, viewed the 1999 coup and subsequent devolution agenda 
as an opportunity for the donor community to push for democratic reform in 
Pakistan.  UNDP found itself intimately involved in the inner workings of the 
NRB and the government’s design of its devolution implementation plan.  A 
UNDP representative in Pakistan argued that devolution represented what was 
perhaps the most transformative social force in the country’s history—though far 
from perfect, a phenomenon worth shaping rather than shunning.  ADB has also 
embraced devolution in its lending program, providing significant support for 
devolution through its Devolution Support and Access to Justice programs. 
 
Some government functionaries and experts hold the view that the Bank 
seems uncomfortable with financing arrangements that move beyond traditional 
support at the federal and provincial levels and is thus “sitting on the sidelines 
while the fight is going on.”  In particular, it was felt that the Bank ought to offer 
direct support for building domestic capacity.  Some contend that its 
ambivalence has to do with the Bank’s close ties to the elite bureaucracy, 
elements of which are threatened by greater power at the local levels.  In fact, one 
senior Government official noted that at times, “it is hard to tell where the World 
Bank ends and the Government of Pakistan begins.”  Others argue that the 
Bank’s stance has more to do with its structure of governance: at present, the 
World Bank is structured to conduct supervision missions at the provincial and 
federal levels; undertaking missions in 101 districts is quite another story. 
 
Whatever the real reason is for the Bank’s ambivalence, its hesitation is 
not unjustified.  Pakistan’s military leaders have long used “democratization” 
and “local governance” as a ruse for further military domination and control.  
Why is this time any different?  The phased local elections of 2000-2001 were 
accompanied by cries of military rigging and accusations of intimidation; the 
transfer of administrative and financial functions from the provincial to local 
levels has been incomplete; and political interference in local decision-making 
has been rife in certain areas.   
 
At the same time, devolution could be an opportunity for the Bank to 
think creatively about how to make an inherently “political” decentralization 
process more sustained and lasting.  Other donors who have embraced 
devolution are under no illusions about its sanctity.  One aid official is quoted as 
                                                 
87 See World Bank, Pakistan Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report, April 28, 2004. 
  44saying: “we did and still have serious reservations about the local government 
plan but we could either equivocate and risk reform failure, or put our money 
behind [the military government] to gain a voice.”88  In Pakistan, as in most other 
developing countries, the line between promoting democratic governance and 
rule of law is inevitably blurred with “politics.”  The jury is still out on whether 
the Bank is willing to engage in “political activity” as other major donors have 
done, or if it will continue to outwardly shun politics where it could have a 
significant positive impact.   
 
Conclusions and Lessons 
 
With its high and persistent levels of poverty and its large and widening 
social gaps, Pakistan has the dubious distinction of being a classic case of growth 
without development. In the face of a hostile social and political setting, repeated 
and apparently enlightened programs of outside support for poverty reduction 
and social progress have failed.  Efforts to help run up against constraints that 
domestic reformers themselves face in shaping pro-poor policies and programs:  
historically high levels of political instability (with among other things resultant 
fiscal and institutional weakness); the power of the semi-feudal landed elite; 
deep ethnic divisions; longstanding disempowerment of the poor, especially of 
women.  
 
The World Bank has dedicated considerable financial resources towards 
reducing poverty in Pakistan.  The Bank’s economic and sector work 
(particularly in the latter part of the review period, culminating in its 2002 
poverty assessment) shows good understanding of the conditions and policies 
that hurt the poor, with repeated mentions of the high levels of land inequality, 
the role of rural power structures, and the political resistance to taxing large 
landowners, for example.   But those conditions and policies did not get 
translated systematically into the Bank’s country strategy, nor into lending 
priorities.  In particular, the economy-wide policies that might make a difference 
for the poor – such as better pricing of irrigation to reduce the loss of natural 
resource assets on which the poor depend, and land taxation to reduce 
distortions which inhibit development of land markets – were not explicitly 
addressed in the Bank’s poverty strategy.   No doubt that was because they 
seemed politically impossible to achieve – but over the long run that might be 
said of other policies -- fiscal, monetary, financial, energy, trade, privatization – 
that the Bank did persist in pushing, with varying degrees of success.  
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boiled down to increased lending for the social sectors.  In the 1990s, the main 
vehicle for increased lending was the Social Action Program (SAP), the idea of 
which was to use the leverage of a large external financial commitment to 
encourage increased domestic spending and expansion of services.  Apart from 
being narrowly focused as a poverty reduction strategy, the Bank’s social sector 
programs, particularly the SAP, were over-ambitious and suffered from weak 
implementation capacity and a variety of other governance failures.  Though the 
deep problems of patronage and corruption in social programs were recognized, 
at least implicitly, early on in the program, the Bank did not find ways to use the 
leverage the size of the program was meant to provide.  In addition, the 
complicated procedures for procurement and financial reimbursements, 
intended to minimize cheating, only compounded the problems due to weak 
administrative capacity.  And the SAP relied heavily on provincial buy-in, 
without providing the clear financial incentives and the transparency to cut 
through the heavily politicized and patronage-based system for social spending 
in most provinces.  To compound the situation, the SAP was an administrative 
and logistical beast; it featured 27 different components (covering different 
sectors in different provinces, and components managed by the central 
government), resulting in huge bureaucratic burdens for government and the 
donors alike.   
 
The problems of weak administrative capacity and poor governance in the 
social sectors were not just specific to the SAP but affected Bank’s social sector 
programs more generally.  In the more traditional social lending programs, these 
problems were better contained, and in some cases there was progress – with 
more trained and dedicated government staff, more focus in health on 
preventive programs, and more schools built.  But in the face of the fundamental 
lack of accountability and transparency, it is not clear that the benefits of the 
Bank’s traditional programs have been sustained beyond the project periods. 
 
The Bank was not naïve about the problems, as is clear from an abundance 
of supervision assessments, aide memoires, audit reports, and third-party 
validations.  But the approach was to keep urging and hoping for better the next 
quarter or the next year, perhaps in the absence of any obvious alternative other 
than to stop disbursing altogether. 
 
In the post-SAP phase, the Bank launched a major micro-credit initiative, 
the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF). The first phase of PPAF has made 
a measurable contribution in the provision of micro-credit, and by relying on 
NGOs, the PPAF has tended to evade some of the governance problems that 
plagued earlier social sector interventions.  More recently, the Bank has provided 
budgetary support to the provincial governments through single-tranche 
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linked to pre-defined progress in social programs among other things.  The SACs 
do not escape the problems of weak governance, but like the SAP are meant to 
provide the Bank with leverage, and in this case leverage at the provincial level.  
This seems to be a reasonable step.  The SACs are a blunt instrument but have 
the advantage of making a halt in lending the default.  For the bureaucracies (the 
governments involved and the Bank itself), it is easier to delay arranging another 
loan than to stop disbursing on an existing loan.  
 
The post-SAP phase has also been marked by a potentially important 
political restructuring in Pakistan:  the Musharraf regime’s devolution program.  
On the one hand, Pakistan’s decentralization program may be designed 
fundamentally to strengthen the hold of the military wing of the ruling party 
(particularly in provinces where that party is less popular).  On the other hand, it 
does involve some transfers of administrative responsibility, with resources 
(though often with large time lags), to sub-provincial governments and were it to 
take hold could make some local and district governments more accountable to 
their own constituents, with healthy consequences for the delivery of social 
services.   The Bank has been cautiously supportive of devolution, but has not 
found ways to support its positive potential without buying into the political and 
other risks it brings.  This has placed it in an awkward position vis-à-vis other 
large donors, such as UNDP and the Asian Development Bank, both of which 
have placed a large stake in the successful implementation of the devolution 




First, it will continue to be difficult to attack poverty in Pakistan without 
addressing the structures of economic and political power.  Incremental 
programs – greater access to social services and greater provision of micro-credit 
– can help people, but will not make a sustainable difference.  A country strategy 
to attack poverty has to include politically sensitive economy-wide economic 
reforms, and a focus on making government, including local government, more 
accountable to people.  Encouraging expansion of social programs through 
lending should not be the centerpiece of the Bank’s poverty reduction strategy.   
 
Second, efforts to encourage improved social programs need to take into 
account the political, institutional and governance problems in those sectors. At 
the least, Bank-sponsored programs should be less ambitious.  Given the grossly 
inadequate levels of public spending on the social sectors, encouraging increased 
expenditures on social services makes sense – but only given at the same time 
improvements in the effectiveness of that spending, with a major focus on issues 
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participation of communities.  
 
Third, leverage is elusive and its limits should be recognized in any 
strategy to encourage progress against poverty.  That is one lesson of the Bank’s 
efforts in the social sectors in the 1990s.  The current approach to leverage with 
the SACs makes it easier bureaucratically to reduce the risk of disbursing against 
programs that are not working, which is a sensible improvement.  But all the 
lending eggs should not be placed in the SAC basket.  SACs should continue to 
be complemented by the PPAF program and by smaller, more traditional 
projects (especially in such areas as community development and 
empowerment) which if successful could then be taken to scale by the 
government.  (The Lady’s Health Worker program created by the government 
and initially small-scale but not being rapidly expanded, is a good example.)    
 
Fourth and finally, though governance has become a part of the World 
Bank’s vocabulary, its meaning and context in the Pakistan program is still 
largely confined to managerial, procurement, and financial issues. There is a 
need to take a broader view of governance, which includes the wider issues of 
local power relations; corruption, rule of law etc. Recent Bank reports, such as 
the 2002 Poverty Assessment, have taken a useful first step in analyzing these 
issues in the context of poverty.   More analytic work (through AAA) should go 
to issues of political economy; this is particularly the case in the social sectors 
and in any gender or community development studies: devolution, the role of 
private schooling, the effect of political institutions on the risks of corruption, all 
deserve attention.   
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Document Title  Date  Report Type 




Women in Pakistan: an economic and social 
strategy 
06/30/90 Publication 
Household consequences of high fertility in 
Pakistan  
12/31/90 Publication 
Costs and finance of higher education in 
Pakistan  
06/31/91  Policy Research Working Paper 
The role of credit in poverty alleviation: the 
Asian experience 
01/01/92  WBI Working Paper 
Sources of income inequality in rural Pakistan: 
a decomposition analysis 
01/31/92  Policy Research Working Paper 
Food security and health security: explaining 
the levels of nutrition in Pakistan 
02/29/92  Policy Research Working Paper 
Pakistan—higher education and scientific 
research: strategy for development and reform 
07/22/92 Sector  Report 
Pakistan—Poverty Assessment  09/25/95  Sector Report 
Pakistan: social assessment demonstrates 
successes of participatory processes 
05/31/96 Newsletter 
Pakistan—improving basic education: 
community participation, system 
accountability, and efficiency 
06/06/96 Sector  Report 
Agricultural growth and poverty in Pakistan  09/30/96  Human Capital Working Paper 
Pakistan—Recent development policy issues, 
and an agenda for change 
03/25/97 Working  Paper 
Profiles on children in South and East Asia and 
the Pacific 
05/02/97 Working  Paper 
Learning and institutional capacity-building in 
South Asia 
01/01/98 Working  Paper 
Pakistan—towards a health sector strategy  04/22/98  Sector Report 
Improving women’s health in Pakistan  05/31/98  Publication 
Pakistan—public expenditure review: reform 
issues and options 
10/07/98 Economic  Report 
1994 and 1995 questionnaires: NWFP surveys   08/31/99  Working Paper 
Education reforms in Balochistan, 1990-1998—a 
case study in improving management and 
gender equity in primary education 
09/30/99 Working  Paper 
Evaluation of the Balochistan Rural Girls’ 
Fellowship Program—Will rural families pay to 
send girls to school? 
11/30/99 Departmental  Working  Paper 
The urban and rural fellowship school: 
experiments in Pakistan—design, evaluation, 
and sustainability 
07/31/00 Departmental  Working  Paper 
Household schooling decisions in rural 
Pakistan 
02/28/01  Policy Research Working Paper 
Afghanistan Border States Development 
Framework Approach 
11/12/01 Working  Paper Pakistan—interim poverty reduction strategy 
paper and joint assessment 
11/15/01  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) 
Pakistan—Development policy review: a new 
dawn? 
04/03/02 Sector  Report 
Pakistan—Poverty assessment: poverty in 
Pakistan—vulnerabilities, social gaps, and rural 
dynamics 
10/28/02 Economic  Report 
Pakistan—Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) Preparation Status Report 
01/31/03  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) 
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Period  Government’s Priorities  World Bank Group’s Priorities 
1951-58    Refugee rehabilitation 
  Rapid industrialization to deal with 
the scarcities created by a trade war 
with India 
  Maintenance and improvement of 
irrigation infrastructure inherited 
from the British 
  Transport infrastructure 
  Irrigation 
  Capital for industrialization 
through public sector 
intermediaries (development 
finance corporation) 
1958-69    Industrialization by guiding private 
sector intro various industries 
  Generating rural employment 
  Creating rural infrastructure such as 
farm to market roads 
  Increasing agricultural productivity 
  Irrigation 
  Development Finance 
Corporation 
  Transport (highways, railways) 
  Natural gas development 
  Education 
  Food storage 
1969-77    Nationalization of large privately 
owned financial and commercial 
houses 
  Nationalization of some private 
schools and colleges 
  Public sector investment in large 
industrial enterprises 
  Further expansion of DFC 
programs 
  New sectors introduced in to 
lending programs including 
livestock, seed development, 
and urban sewerage 
  First program loan aimed at 
supporting policy reform 
1977-88    Revitalization of the private sector 
  Expansion of public sector 
expenditure by heavy domestic 
borrowing 
  Introduction of some Islamic features 
into the economy 
  New set of activities supported 
by the Bank, continuing the 
earlier tradition 
  Decision to phase out the 
support of public sector 
expenditures in salinity control 
and reclamation 
1988-99    Initial opening of the economy to the 
outside 
  Removal of controls on private sector 
investment 
  Initiation of a program of 
privatization 
  Further progress with Islamization 
  Use of public sector banks and 
corporations for political purposes 
  Expenditure on large projects of 
dubious economic value 
  Policy to encourage private sector 
participation in power generation 
  Social action programs 
launched to address the 
problem of persistent social 
backwardness 
  Policy advice on improving the 
efficiency of public sector 
enterprises 
  Policy advice and lending for 
power generation by the 
private sector 
1999-2002    Successful implementation of a 
program aimed at stabilization 
  Sharp reduction in public sector 
expenditures including those on 
  Refocusing Bank Group’s 
lending to promote economic, 
social, and institutional reforms 
  Technical advice on reforming 
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  Establishment of local governments 
with power to tax and spend 
the Central Board of revenues 
  Policy advice, technical 
assistance and financial support 
to the provinces pursuing 
reforms. 
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